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1 Background to the Report 
 
 
 
1.1 DFID-World Bank Policy Research Programme  
 
This study is part of a wider initiative on rural development taken by DFID and the World Bank in 
1997. Discussions between senior staff of DFID's Rural Livelihoods Department (RLD) and the 
World Bank's Rural Development Department in October 1997 agreed on the importance that should 
be attached to the non-farm rural sector.  This then became one of the principal themes for inclusion 
in the DFID-World Bank Collaborative Programme in Rural Development.  To contribute to the 
foundation for joint work on this theme, working within terms of reference drawn up by DFID and 
shared with the Bank, in early 1998 RLD commissioned, under the Advisory and Support Services 
budget line, a project on Non-farm Rural Employment, undertaken by a consortium of UK institutions 
comprising NRI (leading and managing the consortium), UEA, IDS and RIO.  This team undertook a 
desk study in February-April 1998 which sought to:   
1. categorise non-farm rural employment in a manner relevant to policy design;   
2. provisionally identify factors which influence employment patterns; and 
3. provisionally identify types of pro-poor instrument and programme relevant to enhancing rural 
non-farm employment.   
A series of outputs was produced, and summarised in synthesis reports of June and October 1998. 
 
With this foundation, DFID then established contact with research sponsored by the World Bank, co-
ordinated by Dr Peter Lanjouw. Within the framework of the DFID-World Bank Partnership 
Programme, the two institutions initiated a sharing of the outputs of the two research groups, and then 
convened a workshop based on that work, in June 1999.  The objectives of the workshop were to 
consider the implications of current understandings, as informed by this recent research, for policy 
and project interventions and for future research needs. 
 
Subsequent discussions amongst the World Bank and a range of partner agencies in May 2000 
resulted in agreement to follow up actions on the rural non-farm economy (RNFE) under five 
headings, one of which was research.  That agreement is carried through into DFID's collaborative 
programme in rural development with the World Bank.  One of four themes in this joint programme is 
"Rural Non Farm Economy and Livelihood Enhancement", within which is a Policy Research 
Initiative on the RNFE. 
 
The purpose of this initiative is to inform and influence policy making processes for the RNFE within 
a poverty-focused rural strategy, by undertaking action research in selected countries.  Ultimately, a 
contribution to World Bank and DFID policy beyond those particular countries is also sought.  
Following the discussions in the World Bank in May 2000 and after further consultation with World 
Bank, DFID and national staff, countries selected were Uganda; India - the States of Madhya Pradesh 
and Orissa; and Romania, Georgia and Armenia. 
 
The focus of the applied research in India  and Uganda specifically seeks to inform policy on two 
inter-related topics:  
¨ factors which influence poor people's ability to engage in different types of RNFE activities, and  
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¨ the effect of local governance on the development of the RNFE.   
Work in the three central and east European countries seeks to inform policy for the RNFE by 
improving understanding of the policy, institutional and infrastructure constraints on rural non-farm 
livelihoods in these transition economies.  
 
The work in India was started in October 2001, and is ongoing. This report examines the role played 
by, and effectiveness of, local governance institutions in Madhya Pradesh, India. It is the result of a 
collaborative research programme between Natural Resources Institute (UK) and DEBATE (India).  
 
1.2 RNFE and Local Governance 
The emphasis on issues in Local Governance emanates from the realisation that while decentralisation 
(administrative, fiscal and/or political) is a strategy to increase democratic development, per se it 
could merely redistribute powers and functions from the central to the local level. By itself such 
redistribution may not be able to ensure that the institutions of local governance are able to advocate 
or facilitate or promote growth that is equitable and sustainable. The literature on the role and 
importance of RNFE on poverty alleviation has increased in recent years. At the same time the role, 
powers and functions of the institutions of Local Governance have also been documented in detail. 
However, relatively little is known of the role of the institutions of local governance and its impact on 
non-farm activities. This knowledge could prove effective in influencing policy on poverty reduction.  
 
To address the gap in literature the present study has been designed to explore the following two 
hypotheses: 
¨ RNFE is susceptible to positive and negative influences depending on the 
characteristics of local governance; and 
¨ Decentralisation may have beneficial effects on the RNFE by enabling forms of 
supportive local governance. 
 
The term Local Governance in the study refers to both formal and informal institutions of governance. 
The former includes, Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs), and the latter includes the civil society 
organisations, the private sector, and lending/donor agencies. This study adopts the definition of civil 
society developed by Tandon and Mohanty (2000)1 and used by DFID-MP. Civil society is “defined 
as the space independent of the state and the market. It is conceptualised as the sum total of all 
individual and collective action intended for public good” (DFID-MP, 2002) 2. 
 
RNFE includes activities that are outside the primary agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fisheries, whether carried out on one’s own farm or as labour on other’s farm. The main criterion for 
identifying non-farm activity is: does the activity add-value to the product, irrespective of the fact that 
the product has been generated as on-farm activity. For example, if cleaning of grains before they are 
sold fetches a different price than the grain that has not been cleaned, the activity ‘cleaning of grains’ 
will be a non-farm activity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Tandon. R. & Mohanty (2000) Civil Society and Governance: A Research Study in India. Cited in DFID-MP.  
2 DFID-MP (January 2000) Civil Society Organisations of Madhya Pradesh. Bhopal. 
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1.3  The Research Strategy of this study in India 
Research in India has two components. One, examines the factors which influence people's ability to 
engage in different types of RNFE activities; and two, researches the effect of local governance on the 
development of the RNFE.  A two-tiered research methodology has been developed for each of the 
components. The details relating to the first are discussed in NRI Report No 2694. 
 
To test the above hypotheses, it is necessary to examine and understand the structure of local 
government institutions, of civil society, and of the private sector; their roles in local economic 
development; and people’s perceptions of effectiveness of these organisation. The research strategy 
was therefore to undertake a top-down study in Phase I to analyse the structure of formal and informal 
institutions of local governance with the aim to assess their effectiveness. The first activity under 
Phase II (on going in both states) examines at the household level the impact of decentralised 
government on local economic activities; the effect of donor funded projects on the local economy 
and on local democratic institutions; and people’s perception of who is the more effective agent of 
economic development. The second activity in Phase II is the Small Towns’ Survey to assess the role 
of the private sector and higher order settlements in promoting RNFE.  
 
This report is based on the Phase I top-down analysis of local governance institutions completed 
in Madhya Pradesh.  
1.4  Objectives of the Report 
The present study has been designed to achieve the following objectives: 
¨ assess and analyse the current and future role of Local Governance in enhancing the development 
of economic activities; 
¨ assess and analyse the current constraints of Local Governance in enhancing economic 
development locally; and 
¨ assess and analyse the interface between the components of Local Governance, in the two chosen 
districts of Betul and Narsimhapur. 
1.5 Scope of the study 
The study was undertaken in two selected districts in the state of Madhya Pradesh3. In each of these 
districts two blocks and in each of the blocks two Gram Panchayats were selected for the field survey. 
In the selected Gram Panchayats one village was selected to study the local governance institutions. 
Thus, eight villages in the two districts were covered by this study. The analyses in this report at 
district, block and village levels examines the formal and informal institutions of local governance. 
 
An inventory of non-farm activities in the eight villages was generated and is presented in Annex 1. 
This data will be analysed in conjunction with information from the household survey now being 
conducted. The analysis of the current and potential role of the private sector in promoting RNFE will 
be undertaken as part of the detailed household survey and the small towns’ survey.  
1.6 Structure of the report 
Chapter 2 explains the methodology used in this study. Chapter 3 briefly describes the state initiatives 
taken to create the PRI system in MP. Chapter 4 analyses the formal institutions of local governance 
                                                 
3 The methodology for selecting districts, blocks and villages are described in Chapter 2. 
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to assess how effective they would be to promote non-farm activities. The Panchayat Raj has created 
new institutions that are changing the interface between the local government institutions and 
traditional power structures. Chapter 5 analyses the socio-political profiles at village level to 
understand the new forms of power sharing that are emerging and the way it is affecting the 
functioning of the PRIs. Much of the power of local government stems from its revenue generation 
potential and its ability to influence rural development schemes. Chapter 6 examines the potential for, 
and the actual revenue generation, at the three levels of Panchayat. Chapter 7 highlights the limited 
role that local government appears to play in rural development schemes. Chapter 8 examines the role 
and functions of other village level institutions of local governance. Chapter 9 sets out the findings 
and some initial policy implications. 
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2.  Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
2.1 It has been noted that there is considerable information on forms of local governance in India 
and on the growing role of non-farm sector in the rural economy (Fisher et al, 19974). However, little 
is known of the relationship between local governance and the non-farm sector. Hence, to test the 
hypotheses set out and to identify policy options, this study relies heavily on primary data collected 
through fieldwork.  
Designing this study involved several steps. 
1. The selection of districts, blocks and villages to carry out the study. 
2. Developing the two-tiered research strategy 
3. Developing checklist for the top-down analysis. 
 
 These are described below. 
2.2  Selection of Districts 
Given the time and resources, two districts were selected for in-depth study. The selection of the 
districts was purposive in nature following wide ranging consultations with Government officials in 
MP, DFID- Delhi and MP. A visit to each of these districts was made before they were finalised for 
the study. The reasons for choosing Narsimhapur and Betul are as follows. 
 
1. The DFID study on Rural Livelihoods being implemented by ODI is being carried out in the 3 
districts of Tikamgarh, Ujjain and Mandla. Though the ODI and this project are different in 
scope there is some overlap. To avoid further overlap it was decided to avoid working these 
districts. 
 
2. The District Poverty Initiative Programme (DPIP) a World Bank project is present in 14 non-
tribal districts. It focuses on improving service delivery and enhancing income opportunities 
of SHGs in these districts. These districts have a more robust agrarian economy than the tribal 
districts. It was agreed with DFID and MP government that one of the selected districts 
should be a DPIP district.  
 
3. The DFID project, Rural Livelihoods Mission is expected to work in the predominantly tribal 
districts of MP.  DFID-Delhi’s suggestion was to choose one predominantly tribal district to 
coincide with the Mission’s regional focus; and the second district with a stronger agricultural 
economy, i.e., one of the DPIP district. The team was advised to avoid Chinaware and Jaguar 
as there was political unrest associated with the construction of the Armada Dam.  
 
4. Logistically, from the point of view of project implementation, these districts were reasonably 
easier to access.  
 
                                                 
4 Fisher et al (1997) The Forgotten Sector: Non-Farm Employment and Rural Enterprise in India . IT 
Publications. London. 
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5. The Chief Secretary to the Chief Minister agreed with the suggestions made by DFID-India. 
 
The broad characteristics of the districts of Narsimhapur and Betul are described below in Table 2.1. 
  Table 2.1 Characteristics of Districts Selected for the Study 
Narsimhapur Betul 
Agriculturally prosperous Mix of agriculture and forestry 
Higher level of road 
connectivity 
Lower density of roads 
Comprise tribal and non-tribal 
population but does not have 
Schedule V area 
6 blocks of the districts are 
categorised as Schedule V area. 
(i.e. officially designated as 
predominantly tribal). 
Selected for DPIP project 
supported by World Bank 
Selected for food Security 
Mission (Livelihood Mission) 
supported by DFID 
 
2.3 Selection of Blocks, Panchayats and villages 
 
2.3.1 Selection criteria 
The selection criteria used to select blocks and Panchayats are (I) level of RNFE activity; and (ii) 
level of access to roads. The reason for using the first criteria is to examine if there is any difference 
in level of activity of local governance institutions and level of RNFE. Research has shown that road 
infrastructure and access to roads are important determinants of RNFE. Choosing blocks and 
Panchayats using the second criteria would allow this project to examine this relationship in the study 
area. These criteria were applied at each level. This meant that the study would cover two blocks and 
four Panchayats in each block. 
 
2.3.2 Selection of the Block 
In the districts of Narsimhapur and Betul, based on the Census 1991, blocks were categorised as High 
RNFE and Low RNFE. Once the blocks were so categorised the two were selected at random. As 
shown in Table 2.2 the two selected blocks in Narsimhapur are Gotegaon and Babe Chichli; and Betul 
block and Bhimpur in Betul district. 
 
Table 2.2 Characteristics of Blocks Selected for the Study 
District Blocks selected Criteria for selection 
Narsimhapur Gotegaon Categorised as High RNFE 
- Good road access 
- Good Town access 
- High percentage of population in RNFE as per 1991 
Census 
- DPIP block 
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 Chichli Categorised as Low RNFE  
- Poor road access 
- Poor town access 
- Low percentage of population in RNFE as per 1991 
Census 
- DPIP block 
Betul Categorised as High RNFE  
- Good road access 
- Good Town access 
- High percentage of population in RNFE as per 1991 
Census 
Betul 
Bhimpur Categorised as Low RNFE 
- Poor road access 
- Poor town access 
- Low percentage of population in RNFE as per 1991 
Census 
- Schedule V block 
2.3.3  Selection of the Gram Panchayats and villages 
An additional criterion was used to select the Gram Panchayats. It is important that surveys for both 
Access and Local Governance components cover the same villages. This was necessary to link the 
top-down Local Governance analysis by Debate with the village level analysis by Samarthan. 
However, in this case there is the possibility that both Samarthan and Debate could interview the same 
members of the target group. This could lead to over exposure and fatigue in responding earnestly 
during discussions and interviews. It was therefore decided that the selected Panchayats should cover 
more than one village. This meant that each of the study components could cover one village in the 
same Panchayat. 
 
The following Gram Panchayats were selected for the study. 
 
Table 2.3 Shows Characteristics of Panchayats Selected 
District Blocks selected Panchayats selected Criteria for selection 
Manegaon - Low RNFE 
- High Access 
Gotegaon 
Jotheshwar - High RNFE 
- High Access 
Batesra - High RNFE 
- Low Access 
Narsimhapur 
Chichli 
Thalwada - Low Access 
- Low RNFE 
Devgaon - High RNFE 
- High Access 
Betul Betul 
Janthapur - Low RNFE 
- High Access 
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District Blocks selected Panchayats selected Criteria for selection 
Adarsh Dhanora - High RNFE 
- Low Access 
 Bhimpur 
Palaspani - Low Access 
- Low RNFE 
 
 
In each of the selected Panchayats two villages were selected. The villages were selected at random 
through draw of lots. The villages that were finally selected are listed in Table 2.4. The eight villages 
covered by Debate for this study are also shown below.  
 
Table 2.4 Shows the Villages Selected for the Study. 
District Blocks 
selected 
Panchayats selected Villages selected/ covered by 
this report 
Manegaon Paraswad (Debate) 
Manegaon 
Gotegaon 
Jotheshwar Jhoteshwar (Debate) 
Mawai A 
Batesra Batesra (Debate) 
Bandesur 
Narsimhapur 
Chichli 
Thalwada Dahalwada (Debate) 
Thalwada 
Devgaon Devgaon 
Chowki (Debate) 
Betul 
Janthapur Ratanpur  (Debate) 
Bundala 
Adarsh Dhanora Adarsh Dhanora 
Hidli  (Debate) 
Betul 
Bhimpur 
Palaspani Palaspani 
Khatapani  (Debate) 
 
Thus the study was conducted in four villages of four Gram Panchayats in selected two blocks of each 
district. 
2.4  Sources of Information  
The sources of information for the study were both secondary and primary in nature. 
 
Secondary Sources 
The secondary sources of information include: 
(i) Madhya Pradesh Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (MPGSPR Act). 
(ii) Rules framed under the MPGSPR, Act. 
(iii) Orders passed by different departments to give effect to the provisions of the act and 
rules. 
(iv) Guidelines of different schemes and programme. 
(v) Provisions relating to the functioning of the District Planning Council and District 
Government. 
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Primary Sources 
The primary source of information included: 
(i) Income expenditure statement of the Zila, Janpad and Gram Panchayat 
(ii) Minutes of the meeting of Gram Sabha 
(iii) Head of departments involved in RNFE 
(iv) Panchayat representatives 
(v) Panchayat functionaries 
(vi) Persons involved in RNFE activity 
(vii) Members of Gram Sabha 
(viii) Bank officials 
(ix) NGO representatives 
(x) Project representatives 
(xi) Representatives of CBOs 
2.5  Methods of Data Collection 
 
The method of collecting information from primary sources involved: 
(i) Semi-structured interviews from government officials, Panchayat representatives and 
functionaries, bank officials, NGO functionaries, project representatives 
(ii) Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were held with persons involved 
in carrying out RNFE activities and members of Gram Sabha. 
(iii) Visits to the local hats and markets and interviews with the entrepreneurs. 
(iv) Participatory Rural Appraisal exercises were also used to understand the socio- economic 
structures and power structure of the villages.  
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3.  State Initiatives to Constitute Formal Institutions of Local 
 Governance in MP 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In India, the formal institutions of local governance in rural areas are referred to as Panchayat Raj 
Institutions (PRIs). The national policy on PRIs underwent a major change with the enactment of the 
73rd constitutional amendment in 1993. The amendment accorded constitutional status to Panchayats 
and provided them permanency of existence. The provisions of the amendment are directed towards 
the state governments to enable them to frame appropriate legislation within their state. Later in 1996 
the Panchayat Extension Act for Schedule Areas3 was passed as an annexure to the 73rd amendment. 
This is commonly known as Schedule V. 
 
The government of Madhya Pradesh was one the first states in the country, after the 73rd constitutional 
amendment, to legislate and conduct election for Panchayats. The first round of elections was held in 
1994 and the second round in 2000. It is almost 8 years since the state has enacted the act on PRIs. 
During this period the act has undergone 14 amendments (till December 2001).  
 
This chapter first briefly describes the national agenda 4. The state laws in MP have gone much further 
than the national legislation. These are discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this chapter. Based on 
primary data, Chapter 4 analyses the progress made in implementation of the state acts and initiatives 
to assess how effective these institutions would be as promoters of economic activities. 
3.2  The National agenda 
In 1993 the National Parliament passed the 73rd and the 74th amendments related to establishment of 
local governments in rural and urban areas, respectively. These amendments contained provisions that 
were mandatory and discretionary in nature. In case of mandatory provisions the state governments 
did not have any choice. These were to be incorporated in the state act as such. For example, the 
mandatory clauses provided that there shall be a three-tier structure of Panchayat institutions for states 
with population above 20 lakhs (see Figure 3.1). There were similar provisions that related to the 
manner of election to seats of Panchayats reservation in membership, term of Panchayats etc.  
 
The discretionary provisions were recommendatory in nature and provided choices to the state 
governments. The discretionary provisions related to the extent of powers that could be given to the 
Gram Sabha by each state. Each of the state governments has adopted these discretionary provisions 
in varying degrees in their state acts. The next section reviews the extent to which Madhya Pradesh 
has taken forward the national agenda on local governance in their state act. 
 
                                                 
3 Those areas officially designated as ‘tribal’ are referred to as Schedule Areas. 
4 For details see 73rd and 74th Amendments. Government of India, (1990). 
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The 73rd and the 74th amendment are complimentary in nature. Consequently, this study takes in to 
account those provisions of the 74th amendment that are relevant to reviewing the Panchayat Raj 
Institutions in MP. 
Figure 3.1 Showing the Tiered system of Panchayat Raj System and  of Government 
Administration 
     = Government Administration               PRIs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Overview of State Act on PRIs  
The state government passed the Madhya Pradesh Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act (1993) to 
increase the powers of the elected bodies at both village and Panchayat levels. This act related largely 
to defining the role, powers and functions devolved to the Gram Sabha (termed as the system of Gram 
Swaraj) and the role, powers and functions of Panchayat Institutions. Initiatives were also taken to 
change other acts related to the functioning of PRIs; to the constitution and functioning of District 
 
 
 
 
Inst: District (Zila) Panchayat 
Leader:  PRESIDENT 
Elected by, and from elected 
members.  
Members directly elected by the 
district constituency. 
Inst: Janpad 
 
 (same as for 
Zila Panchayat 
Janpad 
Membership 
 
District Collector 
DPC 
Membership: 
    State Minister  
     District Collector  
     CEO 
     Director- DRDA 
     Zilla President 
District 
level 
Instituti
DRDA 
Block 
Development 
Office 
Implements all 
govt. schemes 
Block  
Level 
   Inst:  Gram Panchayat 
Membership: Sarpanch –President 
Elected directly by the electoral. 
Panch: Elected by members of the 
different village Wards.  
Up-sarpanch or Vice President is 
elected by & from the Panch. 
 Village 
Level 
Gram Sabha 
Membership: 
All voters 
Gram Sabha 
8 Village 
Committees 
This level is introduced 
by the MP state Act 
A Gram Panchayat can 
represent more than one 
village.  (Explained in 
section 3.3.1) 
Line Departments 
implementing 
development schemes 
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Planning Committee; and to institutional changes in the line departments at the district and sub-
district level. Each of these is also discussed below.  
 
 
3.3.1 Functioning of the Panchayat Institutions  
As required by the 74th Amendment, there is a three-tier structure of PRIs in the state. 
1. Zila Panchayat (ZP) at the district level; 
2. Janpad Panchayat (JP) at the block level; and  
3. Gram Panchayat (GP) is constituted at the village level.  
 
The ZP and JP are co-terminus with the notified district and block respectively. However, the GP is 
defined with respect to population- one Gram Panchayat for a population of 1000 persons. 
Effectively there could be one or more villages within one Gram Panchayat depending on the 
population size of the villages. All the Panchayats selected for this study cover at least two or three 
villages, with an average population of each at around 500. 
 
Membership 
All the members of each of the three tiers of Panchayat are directly elected. The number of members 
at the ZP and JP range between 10 to 35 and 10 to 25, respectively, depending on the population of 
the district/block. The members to ZP and JP are directly elected from their respective constituency. 
The constituency for JP is defined for a population of 5000 and for ZP over a population of 50,000 
persons. At the GP level wards are defined for every 100 persons. Each ward elects a Panch. The 
number of members of the GP ranges from 10 to 20 members. 
 
The President and Vice-President of the ZP and JP are elected by, and from the elected members, 
where as the President at the GP level, called the Sarpanch, is elected directly by the electorate of the 
GP. The Vice-President (Up-Sarpanch) at the GP level is elected by, and from the members of the GP. 
 
Panchayats at each level are elected for a period of five years. In case of vacancy of the membership 
or post, such vacancy is filled within six months.  
 
There is provision for reservation in membership and of post (President and Vice-President) for the 
scheduled caste, the scheduled tribe and other backward classes. In non-schedule areas the reservation 
is in proportion to the population of these groups in the district/block/village. In scheduled areas the 
post of the President at ZP/JP/GP are reserved for the schedule tribes. There is additional reservation 
for women (one-third) in membership as well as for the post of president in both the scheduled and 
non-scheduled areas. 
 
At each level, members of the Panchayat are expected to meet at least once every month with the 
presence of 50 per cent of members in the GP and one-third in the JP and ZP of the members 
constituting the required quorum. There is however provision for reconvening the adjourned meeting 
of the Panchayat where the provision of quorum does not apply. It will be seen later that this provision 
has been used by the leaders to by-pass wider participation. 
 
The state act of PRIs also requires the constitution of standing committees at each level. There are 
three standing committees at the GP and seven at the JP and ZP levels (details below). Each of the 
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standing committees prepare their respective annual plan and budget that is approved by the general 
assembly of the Panchayat.  
 
The GP is assisted by a Panchayat Secretary who is either a government functionary or a person 
selected by the GP and approved by the Gram Sabha(s) of the Panchayat. The JP and ZP are assisted 
by the Chief Executive Officer who is appointed by the government for the purpose.  
 
The powers and functions of the Panchayats at each of the levels relate to the following: 
(i) Preparation of annual plans and budget. The plan and budget are approved by the Gram Sabha 
in case of GP and by the general assembly of the Panchayat in case of JP and ZP. These are to 
be transmitted to the upper level of Panchayat for consolidation and integration with the 
respective plan and the budget. In case of ZP the plan and the budget is to be sent to the 
District Planning Committee to be integrated with similar plans and budgets prepared by the 
urban bodies, in to the district plan. 
(ii) Re-allocating the funds made available by the central/state government to the lower level of 
Panchayat/Gram Sabha. 
(iii) Each level of the Panchayat has the responsibility to monitor and coordinate the activity of the 
lower level of Panchayat/Gram Sabha. 
(iv) Exercise control over government functionaries transferred to each of level of Panchayat.  
(v) GP has the mandate to establish, manage and regulate markets and melas. 
(vi) JP has the responsibility to provide relief in case of distress caused by fires, floods, drought, 
earthquake, scarcity, locusts, swarms, epidemics and other natural calamities. 
(vii) ZP can advise the state government on protection of environment, social forestry, family 
welfare, welfare of the disabled, destitute women, youth, children and weaker sections of the 
society. 
 
Special Provisions for Schedule Areas (Schedule V) 
The provisions of the Panchayat Extension in Schedule Areas act have been incorporated in the state 
act on Panchayats. The special provisions relate to all levels of Panchayats and the Gram Sabha. 
These are presented in Box 1. 
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Box 3.1: Shows the Additional Powers of PRIs in Schedule V Areas . 
 
3.3.2 Powers and functions specific to the Gram Sabha 
Gram Sabha is defined with respect to a “village”. The persons enrolled in the electoral roll of the 
village define the membership of Gram Sabha in the village. 
 
Over a period of eight years the government of Madhya Pradesh has undertaken steps that have 
gradually established, in law, the primacy of Gram Sabha within the system of rural local governance. 
In the first state act in 1993, the Gram Sabha was an essentially a recommendatory body to the Gram 
Panchayat. In 1994, the state act was amended and the Gram Sabha was entrusted with the powers to 
approve the plan and annual expenditure of the Gram Panchayat. Later on in 1999, the Gram Sabha in 
all the villages were endowed with powers to exercise control over natural resources; over institutions 
and functionaries involved in social sector; and over government functionaries transferred to the 
Panchayat sector. The latest amendment in January 2001 has recognised the Gram Sabha as a legal 
entity with its own seal and succession and has empowered it with specific powers and functions 
(refer para 3.2.1 of the Act). However, this multiplicity of legislation has caused much confusion 
among the people and the elected members. This is discussed below. 
 
The devolution of powers and functions to Gram Sabha has been accompanied by enabling orders 
from each department that has effectively transferred administrative function to the Gram Sabha under 
different activities carried out by the departments. The Gram Sabha have also been empowered to 
open their bank accounts so that the state can transfer resources to each of these units under different 
schemes and programmes. 
 
Thus constitutionally, the Gram Sabha is recognised as an active and empowered body to take 
decisions concerning the village. 
 
 
 
 
Gram Sabha in the schedule areas have the additional powers to : 
(i) practice and follow traditions and customs and to undertake measures for their protection and 
conservation; 
(ii) protect, conserve and manage community resources according to their customary practices; 
(iii) dispute resolution according to their customary mode; 
(iv) management of natural resources, and hat, fair and cattle fair; and 
(v) exercise control expenditure and the source of expenditure. 
GP in the schedule areas have the additional powers to: 
(i) exercise control over expenditure and source of expenditure in the local plan including the tribal 
sub-plan; and 
(ii) management of local market, fair and cattle fair. 
JP and ZP in schedule areas have the power to: 
(i) own and manage minor water bodies; 
(ii) control over institutions and functionaries of social sector transferred to Panchayats; and 
(iii) exercise control over expenditure and source of expenditure in the local plan including the tribal 
sub-plan. 
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Some of the rights and responsibilities of the Gram Sabha are as follows: 
¨ In Madhya Pradesh Gram Sabha has been recognised as a legal entity. It implies that the Gram 
Sabha can acquire and sell property; it can sue and be sued, and enter in to contracts with people 
and institution in its own name. 
 
¨ Gram Sabha is expected to meet at least once every month. For a meeting of the Gram Sabha to 
be legitimate it should have a minimum quorum of 20 per cent of the membership of the Gram 
Sabha. The additional requirement for the meeting to be legal is the presence of women (one-
third of the quorum) and of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe members in proportion to their 
population in the village. The meeting of the Gram Sabha is to be chaired by Sarpanch/Up-
Sarpanch/Panch of the Gram Panchayat of the village.  
 
¨ With the Gram Swaraj Act each revenue village is to have a Gram Sabha. To enable the Gram 
Sabha to carry out its function eight standing committees have to be constituted in each village. 
The Gram Sabha elects the members of these committees for a period of five years. There is 
provision of reservation for women and scheduled caste, scheduled tribes and other backward 
classes in the membership of the committee. The eight committees are: 
 
1. Gram Vikas Samiti (Village Development Committee) 
2. Sarvajanik Sampada Samiti (Public Resources Committee) 
3. Krishi Samiti (Agriculture Committee) 
4. Swasthya Samiti (Health Committee) 
5. Gram Raksha Samiti (Village Security Committee) 
6. Adhosarovachna Samiti ( Infrastructure Committee) 
7. Shiskha Samiti (Education Committee). 
8. Samajik Nyay Samiti ( Social Justice Committee) 
 
 The Gram Vikas Samiti is constituted with the membership of the Presidents of the other 
seven committees, the Sarpanch and the Up-Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. The 
responsibility for finalising the annual plans and budgets of each of the committees and 
consolidating them in to a village plan/budget as well as seeking approval of the Gram Sabha 
is vested with the Gram Vikas Samiti. 
 
 The Secretary of the Gram Panchayat is also the Secretary of the Gram Sabha and the Gram 
Vikas Samiti. In the instance when there are more than one village in the Gram Panchayat, the 
secretary of GP is the secretary of all the villages covered by the Panchayat. The other 
standing committees nominate their respective secretaries.  
 
¨  The Village Fund: this includes cash, grain, material and labour. The account of each of these 
funds is maintained by the Treasurer, who is selected by the Gram Vikas Samiti and the Gram 
Sabha approves his appointment.   
 
¨   Powers have been devolved from the Gram Panchayat to the Gram Sabha giving considerable 
responsibility and control over management of its resources. These are listed in Box 2.  
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Box 3.2 Powers and Functions Devolved from the Gram Panchayat to the Gram Sabha  
 
 
 
In addition to these powers and functions, the state government has also devolved the functions of 22 
line departments to the Gram Sabha. To support this devolution the government has also issued 
guidelines that stipulate the distribution of functions, schemes of different departments to the standing 
committees of the Gram Sabha. The rules relating to preparation of annual budget have been framed 
to enable the Gram Sabha to undertake annual planning and budgeting in their village. 
 
It is clear that wide ranging powers have been given to the Panchayat institutions and particularly to 
the Gram Sabha. This has important implications for promoting of non-farm activities. How the 
devolved powers have been used; by whom and to what purpose are examined in the next chapter.  
 
3.4 Changes in Other Related Acts 
The functions of Panchayats are not only controlled by the provisions of the state act on Panchayat, 
but are subject to the provisions of other acts as well. To make these acts consistent with each other 
and to create an enabling environment for Panchayats to function in, the state has made corresponding 
amendments to other acts and rules. They relate to four different domains of PRIs. These are 
discussed below. 
 
1.  Amendments to Acts related to village/Gram Sabha 
(a) The rules relating to the implementation of the Forest act have been amended to enable the Gram 
Sabha to declare minimum support price (in other words the minimum price that the trader can 
demand) of de-nationalised non-timber forest produce. Similar powers have been extended to the 
GP for villages within its area and to JP for all the villages within its area. 
 
1. Approve annual plan of the Gram Sabha and the Gram Panchayat; 
2. Selection of beneficiaries for the schemes implemented by different departments; 
3. Manage and exercise control over natural resources; 
4. Monitor the performance of village level functionaries of various line departments and the manner of 
implementation of schemes; 
5. Management and maintenance of public land, property, grazing land, ancient and historical monuments, and 
cattle ponds; 
6. Maintain records of births, deaths, marriages, and cattle; 
7. Ensure basic services for sanitation, conservancy and abatement of nuisance; 
8. Construct and maintain public wells, ponds and tanks for domestic use; sources of water for bathing, washing 
and supply of water for domestic animals; village roads, culverts, bridges and bunds; public streets, latrines, 
drains and other public places; and filling of un-used wells, unsanitary ponds, pools, ditches and pits; 
9. Regulate matters relating to construction of houses, toilets, drains, entertainment shows, shops, eating places, 
places for disposal of dead bodies, carcasses, slaughter of animals, sale and preservation of meat, use of water 
from rivers, streams and minor water bodies, establishment of workshops, factories and other industrial units, 
and offensive and dangerous trade; 
10. Provide assistance in prevention of contagious diseases, inoculation and vaccination, census operations and 
various surveys conducted by government; 
11. Assist and promote activities related to the disabled and destitute, Panchayat forests, youth welfare, family 
welfare and sports; and  
12. Undertake social audit and certify the audit of work undertaken by the Gram Panchayat 
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(b) The state act transferred some of the powers from officials in the Land Revenue Department to 
the Gram Sabha. These powers relate to settling land-related disputes. Similarly, the powers to 
appointment a Kotwar (the village guard), to survey of land, to resolve un-disputed mutation and 
division of undisputed land have been transferred to the Gram Sabha. These changes are expected 
to reduce procedural delays. 
 
(c) The Money Lending Act has been suitably amended to empower the Gram Sabha in schedule 
areas to grant license to moneylenders operating in their area and to determine the rate of interest 
that will be charged by such persons/institutions. Previously usurious rates were set by the money 
lenders. 
 
(d) The Excise Act has been amended for Schedule Areas to enable the tribal communities to 
undertake traditional preparation and storage of liquor subject to limits specified in the Act. 
  
(e) The Mining Act has been amended to give ownership rights over minor minerals to the Gram 
Sabha. This allows the Gram Sabha to lease out natural resources to local villagers. 
 
2 District Planning Committee (DPC) 
The 74th Amendment requires the DPC to be constituted and enjoins it to consolidate plans prepared 
by the rural and urban bodies as the Draft Development Plan for the District. The rural plan is led by 
the ZP; the urban plans by respective urban bodies in the district.  
 
The constitutional amendment gives discretion to the state government in defining the composition of 
the DPC and to provide additional powers to it. In Madhya Pradesh, the DPC is headed by a Minister 
of State (generally a regional leader) nominated by the state government, with the District Collector as 
the Secretary. The DPC has been endowed with considerable financial and administrative powers over 
departments and its functionaries. With the Minister as its Chairperson and the District Collector as its 
Secretary, the DPC has greater ‘administrative clout’ than either the Zila Panchayat or any of its 
constituting urban bodies.  
 
From 2001- 02 the DPC in each district has been made responsible for the preparation of district plan 
for resources earmarked for the district by the state for each financial year.  
 
3  Institutional changes in Line Departments  
The state government in 1996 announced the Guiding Principles Related to Decentralisation of 
Powers, Responsibility and Programmes in the state. These principles stated the intention of the state 
to develop PRIs as institutions of local self-governance (as against units of line management). Within 
PRIs the ZP is to emerge as District Government, the JP as ZP’s main implementing agency. The GP 
is to be given the managerial control of such agencies that work within the village/Panchayat 
jurisdiction.  
 
To achieve the above objectives 18 departments at the district and sub-district level were divided in to 
the Panchayat sector and the State sector. The functions and the functionaries of each of these 
departments were transferred to Panchayat sector; except functions and functionaries that were 
involved in research and training. Additionally, the budgets related to rural areas for the functions that 
have been transferred would be gradually transferred to Panchayats. 
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4  Institutional Convergence: Merger of District Rural Development Authority (DRDA) 
with Zila Panchayat 
In pursuance of the order of Government of India to reorganise the DRDA in the districts by bringing 
the DRDA under the aegis and control of the Zila Panchayat, the government of Madhya Pradesh 
went a step further and brought about an effective merger of the DRDAs with the Zila Panchayat. The 
merger imparted legal sanctity to the relationship between the DRDA and Zila Panchayat and also 
theoretically allows them to exercise greater fiscal powers over the development expenditure in the 
district.  
 
To sum up, it is clear that the state government in Madhya Pradesh has devolved wide ranging 
powers and responsibilities to the formal institutions of local governance. Some of these relate to 
management of local natural resource and of certain funds; planning for local development; and 
monitoring the performance of functionaries of line departments. The state Acts have theoretically 
made the Panchayats potentially very powerful in local politics and as agents of development. Next 
chapter examines how effective these institutions have been in exercising the devolved power and in 
executing the stipulated functions.  
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4. Functioning of Formal Institutions of Local Government  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The process of decentralisation in MP has involved the transfer of resources, tasks and decision 
making to lower-level authorities who are (a) democratically elected; and (b) expected to be largely 
independent of the state and central government. The contention is that local control, sufficient 
funding and accountability of elected representatives will lead to more equitable use of resources, 
improved social and economic  development and hence alleviate poverty. There are two underlying 
assumptions here. One, those representatives at lower levels will be able to use the power devolved; 
and two, and power and resources devolved will be better used at the local level. However, the usage 
depends on the nature of local politics. Harris (1999: 3371) notes that MP is classed as low income 
state where upper caste/class dominance has persisted and Congress has remained strong in the 
context of a two party system “reflecting traditional dominance rather than politics of accommodation 
vis-à-vis lower classes”. In 2002, the state politics is still dominated by Congress. It is in this wider 
context that the analysis of formal institutions is undertaken.  
 
The State Act (1993) notes that the basis of equitable development is promotional representation. It 
stipulates the ratio of elected representatives (See Box 3.1). This chapter first looks at the membership 
of caste and gender at all three levels of local government. PRIs are expected to influence 
development through their role in planning and implementation of development schemes; their greater 
control over government functionaries and line departments; and of their own natural resource base. 
Hence, this chapter assess the performance by investigating the following aspects: 
 
¨ Role of PRIs in preparation of Plans, including planning for Centrally Sponsored Schemes; 
¨ extent of PRIs involvement in the implementation of development schemes; 
¨ control of elected members over government officials; 
¨ coordination with line departments; and  
¨ relationship of the Zila Panchayat with DPC. 
 
The analysis under each of the above heads, is based on discussions with Panchayat representatives, 
government officials, and the members of Gram Sabha on their own role; and the support that have 
been provided by functionaries of other institutions. Each of these aspects is discussed for the three 
institutional levels. 
 
4.2 District Level Analysis 
 
4.2.1  Membership: Caste and Gender Representation  
Table 4.1 shows the structure of Panchayat institutions at different levels in Narsimhapur and Betul. 
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 Table 4.1 Number of PRIs in Narsimhapur and Betul Districts  
District Zila 
Panchayat 
Janpad 
Panchayats 
Gram 
Panchayats 
Gram Sabhas 
Narsimhapur 1 6 422 1040 
Betul 1 10 550 1296 
 Source: Directorate of Panchayat and Social Welfare, Government of MP. 
 
In Betul, a Schedule V Area has 6 Janpad Panchayats, 276 Gram Panchayats and 689 Gram Sabha 
have been classified as. According to the reservation rules set out in the national amendments and the 
state acts, there should be a third of women membership at all levels. The membership profile of the 
Panchayats is shown in Table 4.2. 
 Table 4.2 Caste and Gender of Panchayat Representatives in Betul and        
      Narsimhapur Districts  
Zila Panchayat Janpad 
Panchayat 
Gram Panchayat District 
Total Women Total Women Total Women 
Narsimhapur 
 
 SC 
 ST  
 OBC 
 Others 
12 
 
2 
3 
5 
2 
4  
(33%) 
 
1 
1 
2 
- 
106 
 
21 
17 
49 
19 
41 
(39%) 
08 
07 
17 
09 
5231 
 
893 
805 
1246 
2287 
1907 
(36%) 
300 
263 
414 
930 
Betul 
 
 SC 
 ST 
 OBC 
 Others 
19 
 
2 
9 
4 
4 
8 
 
2 
3 
1 
2 
189 
 
16 
82 
53 
38 
69 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
8766 
 
839 
4381 
1196 
2350 
2897 
 
252 
1430 
417 
798 
 Source: Directorate of Panchayat and Social Welfare, Government of MP. 
 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show that at all three levels of the Panchayat membership of women is above one-
third the total membership. Interviews and discussions show that, on a positive note, this process has 
opened up opportunities for women to learn and explore. It has also created the scope for developing 
women role  models at the local level. However, power relations have changed very little. Elected 
women, members of the schedule caste and schedule tribes are generally a front for the traditional 
power base. The husband of the elected woman member holds the true power. The team found that in 
districts of mixed population, like Narsimhapur where the traditional power structure is dominated by 
general castes, the election of members for the reserved seats are not always straight forward. In such 
non-schedule areas, very often the elected schedule caste/tribe member is a front for the established 
power base. This politics of co-option is possible because of lack of accountability between elected 
member and the electorate. This is less of a problem in Betul, a predominantly tribal district.  
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      Table 4.3 Caste and Gender of Panchayat Presidents in Betul and Narsimhapur Districts  
Zila Panchayat 
President 
Janpad Panchayat 
President 
Gram Panchayat 
President 
District 
Total Women Total Women Total Women 
Narsimhapur 
 
 SC 
 ST  
 OBC 
 Others 
1 
 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6 
 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
 
1 
1 
- 
- 
422 
 
73 
61 
107 
181 
142 
 
24 
20 
36 
62 
Betul 
 
 SC 
 ST  
 OBC 
 Others 
1 
 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
10 
 
1 
7 
1 
1 
4 
 
1 
3 
- 
- 
550 
 
35 
342 
69 
104 
185 
 
9 
121 
26 
29 
 Source: Field study (2001). 
 
4.2.1 The Zila Panchayat  
As noted earlier some of the principle devolved functions of the ZP are to prepare annual plans for the 
district, for centrally sponsored schemes, to liaise with the DPC and to co-ordinate with line 
departments. This section shows there is considerable difference in the interpretations of the functions 
and roles of the Panchayats by line departments and the elected members, and hence of their 
expectations.  
 
There were 19 members in Betul Zila Panchayat and 12 in Narsimhapur. In Betul and Narsimhapur 
the post of Zila Panchayat Chairperson has been reserved for Scheduled Caste and Other Backward 
Caste, respectively. 
 
1. Preparation of Plans  
Provisions of the act:  The state act on Panchayat Raj enjoins the Zila Panchayat to prepare annual 
plans for economic development and social justice of the district and to ensure coordinated 
implementation of such plans in respect of the matters transferred to Panchayats (sec 52 (i)). 
 
In addition the Zila Panchayats (Budget Estimates) Rules 1997 has provided for the following to 
enable the ZP to plan and prepare its budgets every year: 
¨ the various departments of the government should indicate to the Zila Panchayat the amounts 
likely to be allotted for various assigned to it. Such intimation is to reach the ZP offices by 10th 
August every year. 
¨ CEO and the ZP are to prepare a statement of funds likely to be made available to the ZP, 
including Grants-in-aid, from various departments under different programmes and communicate 
the same to each of the standing committees of the ZP by 15 October every year. This would 
enable the standing committees to undertake detailed exercise for planning for each programme 
and submit their annual plan to the general assembly of the ZP by 30 November every year. 
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¨ The process of scrutiny of the budget, statement of proposed allocations and approval of the 
budget takes place by 31January when it is communicated to the Prescribes Officer for approval. 
¨ ZP receives the approval of the budget by 15 March every year. 
 
Perceptions of ZP Representatives:  
The study team conducted interviews with ZP representatives. The views expressed are summarised 
below. 
¨ ZP representatives noted that they were not informed about the probable funds available to 
them in a year. 
 
¨ The information to ZP members (including the members of the standing committees) is 
generally provided piecemeal. The officials from the relevant departments circulate the 
planning target that has been communicated to them by the office at the state level and only 
seek the approval of the committee. The members are not consulted in setting the target nor do 
they discuss the relevance of targets. When asked for more information the  officials frequently 
said that it has been decided by the state and they do not have the remit or the power to change 
it. This is true in case of schemes and programmes that have been transferred to the Panchayat 
sector under demand number 15, 80 and 825. 
 
¨ The line departments did not prepare any brief about the schemes or the programmes to enable 
the members to know about the details of each scheme. Additionally, there is no brief on the 
total number of programmes of the department so that the ZP members cannot take a holistic 
view of department activities.  
 
¨ The common complaint of the ZP representatives was that the officials never volunteer 
information. They give information only when they ask a specific question. They believe that 
this restricts their level of participation in meetings. 
 
Perceptions of District level officials:  
The district level officials in Betul and Narsimhapur have a narrower interpretation of the functions 
and roles of the ZP. Additionally,they still see their role as the main implementing arm of the line 
department rather than as a part of the Panchayat sector. The views expressed are summarised below. 
 
¨ The role of ZP is to assist the schemes in securing public participation. As the ZP members are 
people’s representatives they should focus in assisting the implementation of the schemes and 
should not interfere in government’s tasks, that is, preparing detail plans for implementation 
and prioritisation. 
 
¨ The district officials feel that their prime responsibility and accountability is towards their 
superiors at the state level. Hence they follow the instructions (even if they are sent as advice) 
of their superior officials. They do not believe that they are under the control of ZP even if they 
                                                 
5 Demand 15: Special component funding for Schedule Caste under financial assistance to PRIs at three levels. 
Demand 80: Section under which financial assistance is provided to all three tiers 
Demand 82: Financial assistance to PRI under Tribal Sub-plan (for pockets of tribal areas outside Schedule 
areas. 
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belong to the Panchayat sector in the division of work at the district and sub-district level. 
Manor in his study of PRIs in Karnataka made the same observation (2000). 
 
¨ They note that when there are no district level plans for the departments, hence it is difficult to 
have a district level plan for the Zila Panchayat. Moreover, till the current year (2001-02) there 
has been no district-wise allocation of funds to the departments. This makes it difficult for 
either the line department or the ZP to plan.  
 
¨ Form 2002-03 the state government has moved to a system of district planning and budgeting. 
In this exercise 30 per cent of the funds of the department are allocated to the district for 
preparing the district plan for the department. This process of planning was however 
undertaken through the sub-committees of the DPC and not through the system of ZP.  
 
These discussions with ZP representatives and the district officials shows that little planning activity 
is taking place at the district level. Whatever planning activity is taking place is controlled and 
dominated by bureaucrats. The ZPs in the two districts however, do undertake annual budgeting 
exercise, but that is also largely led by the district officials. There is also a reluctance to share 
information with these elected representatives. There is an unwillingness to work with local 
politicians. It is also likely that the representative, being unfamiliar with the minutiae of bureaucratic 
systems, do not ask the right questions. This raises questions of accountability to elected officials and 
reward systems in the decentralised structure, and of capability of representatives. These are discussed 
at the end of this section. 
 
2. Planning for Centrally Sponsored Schemes 
The central (national) government funds all rural development schemes. The money for Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes (CSS), implemented by the Rural Development Department, is sent directly to 
the districts. The money is received by the DRDA, the nodal agency that implements all central 
schemes, goes into separate accounts in the district. The amount to be received in each district is 
decided by the central government based on an index that varies from scheme to scheme, e.g. it is 
poverty in case of JGSY and backwardness in case of EAS. This amount remains at the same level 
(with the exception of variations that are contingent on the district’s performance in the last financial 
year) during the plan period. That is, the district (or the DRDA) knows in advance the amount of 
money that it will receive during the year under CSS of the Rural Development Department.   
 
The CSS of the Rural Development Department in the two districts include: 
(i) Schemes pertaining to housing:  IAY, Credit cum Subsidy Scheme for Rural Housing  
(ii) Wage employment schemes:  EAS and JGSY 
(iii) Self employment schemes:  SJGSY 
(iv) Social assistance programme: OAP, FBS, MBS 
(Please see glossary for explanation of these acronyms). 
 
According to the central government guidelines the responsibility for preparing annual action plan for 
the above schemes is as follows:  
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 Table 4.4 Responsibility for Preparation of Annual Action Plan for Centrally    
         Sponsored Schemes 
Scheme  Responsibility for Preparation 
IAY ZP on the basis of allocation by the centre will divide the number of 
houses to be constructed for each GP. The beneficiary will be 
identified by the Gram Sabha and intimated to the ZP. 
Credit cum Subsidy 
scheme for Rural 
Housing  
Identification of appropriate implementing agency left to the 
discretion of the state government. 
EAS ZP to prepare annual action plan. 
JGSY GP to prepare annual action plan that will be technically appraised 
by the JP. ZP to guide coordinate and supervise the works identified 
and undertaken by GPs. 
SJGSY Annual action plan to be prepared by ZP and implemented by JP 
OAP Panchayats responsible for implementation. Identification of 
beneficiaries to be done by GP/Gram Sabha. 
FBS Panchayats responsible for implementation. Identification of 
beneficiaries to be done by GP/Gram Sabha. 
MBS Panchayats responsible for implementation. Identification of 
beneficiaries to be done by GP/Gram Sabha. 
 Source: Guidelines for different schemes 
 
Table 4.4 shows that the ZP has the overall responsibility for implementing the CSS for rural 
development. ZP and GP are also responsible for preparing the annual action plan for EAS and 
SJGSY. For other schemes it has the role of guiding the lower level of Panchayat and scrutinising that 
the list of beneficiaries is as per the eligibility criteria of the government. For the other schemes, the 
role of the PRI is restricted to selection of beneficiaries.  
 
The present study focuses on the process involved in the preparation of annual action plan under EAS 
and SJGSY at the ZP level. The study found that though the annual action plans for both the schemes 
have been prepared the elected bodies had a very limited role. 
 
a. The ZP representatives were unaware of the total amount that the district is expected to receive 
under CSS every year. It could be that this information was not shared. However, the 
representatives were neither aware of the stipulated decrease in funds in case the unutilised 
amount is in excess of the 15 per cent of the amounts received by the district during one 
financial year. Clearly the elected representatives had not made themselves familiar with the 
planning guidelines. 
 
b. In both districts a District Level Coordination Committee has been formed to plan for the 
SJGSY Scheme. In both districts the committee is headed by the District Collector. Neither of 
the committees have representatives of the ZP in its composition. The committee takes 
decisions concerning SJGSY and the ZP approves the plan. As the elected members generally 
have limited planning capability and inadequate knowledge of the planning process, line 
departments and district administration tends to by-pass them and give little attention.  
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c. 30 per cent of the funds received under EAS are within the purview of ZP. However, in both 
the districts the DRDA had prepared the plan for the implementation of EAS works and sought 
approval from the ZP.  
 
When the ZP and DRDA officials were asked why the ZP had not been involved in planning for either 
the SJGSY or the EAS, they reiterated that seeking administrative sanction from the ZP is equivalent 
to the involvement of ZP in decision-making. Additionally, the officials believed that the guidelines 
do not ask for the involvement of the ZP or any of its committees in the actual preparation of the plan.  
 
Furthermore, the wide ranging discussions revealed that in reality neither the officials nor ZP have 
much scope for planning for these schemes. The schemes are top-down and lack flexibility. Activities 
and sectors that can be covered by the different schemes are clearly stated with little space to 
manoeuvre. Planning activity is thus selecting projects. Thus, in addition to problems of 
accountability and capability noted above, it appears that while planning powers have been devolved 
to the district and sub-district levels, the schemes are ‘straight jacketed’ and provide limited scope to 
exercise power. 
 
3. Implementation of Centrally Sponsored Development Schemes 
The general scheme of distribution of work at the district level assumes ZP as the planning and 
approving body and the line departments as the implementing agencies. The DRDA is expected to 
play the role of a support agency to the ZP (undertaking research and training based activities). 
 
At Betul and Narsimhapur the central schemes of rural development were being implemented through 
the DRDA. The line departments in both the districts were involved in implementation through their 
sub-district officials. (The details of schemes and their activities are discussed in detail in Chapter 6). 
 
The externally aided projects and those that are implemented in the Mission mode are executed 
outside the purview of the ZP in both the districts. In case of these projects the ZP is not even 
informed about the aims and objectives, the coverage and the amount available under the project. For 
example, the World Bank DPIP programme has set up a parallel structure at the village level, with no 
links to democratic institutions.  
 
The departments report that they regularly submit the progress reports of the department to the ZP 
meetings. The ZP members on the other hand report that though the reports are being submitted the 
queries raised by them go unanswered by the department. In fact according to the ZP members, the 
major cause of dispute between the officials and the members is because of the bureaucratic 
unwillingness to answer questions raised by the members. They argue that this severely restricts their 
ability to make informed judgement about the process and progress of implementation and its 
outcome.  
 
4 Control over government officials 
The division of the functions and functionaries of the 18 departments into the Panchayat sector and 
State administrative sector has placed the government officials under the administrative control of 
Panchayats. This has made ZP the controlling body for government officials posted at the district 
under the control of the ZP.  
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The ZP representatives report that the officials seldom give cognisance to their orders or instructions. 
They have to resort to putting pressure on either the Collector or the CEO to make the district officials 
respond to their directions. Most of the ZP representatives were not aware of the extent of their power 
over officials. For example, they were not aware that they are empowered to write the Annual 
Character Roll of district level officials. This character certificate is considered central to future career 
prospects. While the elected representatives clearly feel ignored by the state functionaries, they, in 
turn have not informed themselves of the procedures, processes and guidelines associated with local 
governance. It would appear that the State Act has attempted to address the problem of bureaucratic 
accountability to elected officials. It implies the need for an attitudinal change across the board.  
 
The government officials reported that they do give attention to the directions from the ZP, but the 
instructions from the state are much more important to them. This is so because the final arbiter of 
their performance is their superior at the state level who will take the decision regarding their 
promotion and transfer. Thus in terms of career advancement and in terms of assessment of their work 
it is their administrative superior in the department who is more important that the ZP member. 
 
5. Coordination with line departments  
As noted earlier, there are seven standing committees in ZP. These are: Agriculture; Education; 
Communication and Works; Cooperation and Industry; Health, Women and Child Welfare; and 
Forests. The ZP is empowered to coordinate with the line departments at the meeting of the standing 
committees, or during the meeting of the general assembly of the ZP. The members of the line 
departments at the district level are nominated by the CEO as Secretary of the standing committees of 
the ZP.  
 
The act stipulates that the standing committees should meet at least once every month. In both 
Narsimhapur and Betul the study found out that the standing committees do meet regularly and that 
the departments at the district are being represented in each of these committees. However, at 
Narsimhapur the minutes of the meetings of the standing committees are in the custody of the 
respective department. These records are not available at the ZP office. This is unusual because the 
minutes of the meetings of the standing committee are the records of the ZP and not of the relevant 
line department. 
 
During discussions, the ZP representatives revealed that meetings are a mere formality. The 
government official submits progress of schemes and programmes only to seek approval for 
withdrawal of money. There is very little discussion of the situation and the impact of schemes in the 
district. The members are not involved in the discussions to identify potential areas of intervention in 
the distric t, or any discussion on the developmental needs of the district. For example, the standing 
committee on Industry and Cooperation has not discussed the state of industries or cooperatives in the 
district so far in either of the districts. Nor have they rela ted the district reality to the schemes that are 
being implemented by the departments. 
 
6. Relationship with District Planning Committee  
The DPC at Narsimhapur comprises of 15 members out of which 13 were members of ZP including 
the Chairperson of the ZP. At Betul there were 15 ZP members out of 20 members of the DPC.  
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The ZP members report that the DPC does not interfere with the areas earmarked for Zila Panchayat. 
It generally restricts itself to the areas that have been marked for it. However, the members feel that 
the presence of the Minister in the DPC as its Chairperson has diminished the importance of the ZP as 
the government officials are inclined to be attentive towards the preferences of the Minster and not 
that of the ZP.  
 
As the Panchayats at village, Janpad and Zila level have not undertaken preparation of annual plan in 
the spirit that has been mentioned in the act, the DPC has not undertaken any exercise to consolidate 
the plans of the urban and the rural areas as the draft plan for the district. The preparation of district 
budget that has been initiated from the current year for the financial year 2002-03 has been undertaken 
under the aegis of the DPC. The ZP has not been involved though the plans and the budgets that have 
been prepared under the district budget legitimately belong to the functional domain of the Zila 
Panchayat. 
 
Summing up:  The analysis shows that the real centre of power is at the district level. This power 
rests with the bureaucrats, more specifically with the District Collector. Further down the line the 
government officials continue to exercise more power over decision-making than elected members by 
limited information sharing and by minimising the role of ZP to rubber-stamping. This raises 
questions of accountability. Manor (1995) 6 notes that accountability has to be achieved at two levels: 
first is between the bureaucrats and the elected members; and second is between the politicians and 
the public (the latter is discussed in Chapter 5). Neither is easy to achieve nor is there a blueprint for 
success. With respect to first, Manor (ibid.) notes that bureaucrats have little regard for the ‘small fry’ 
elected in a decentralised system. Even if they overcome their disinclination to work with local 
politicians, they lack the skills to work productively with politicians. To increase accountability he 
notes that the authority to discipline them should also move to the local authority. The state Act 
(1993) has tried to partially redress this issue by shifting some of the control of the reward system to 
the ZP, but this is not working. Blair (2000) 7 observes that the compromise model in Karnataka is not 
perfect, but it works. Very often, for personal and career reasons, government employees do not wish 
to be decentralised. In the event they are, they need to please their superior bureaucrats. In Karnataka, 
the compromise is “elected officials direct civil servants in their jurisdiction, while the line ministries 
write their annual evaluation reports that determine career progression”.  
 
While the problem of accountability is widespread, it is also seems that the elected members are not 
really interested in good governance. While they complain that there is limited information sharing 
they are not familiar with their rights, responsib ilities and functions.  
 
Overall, district level institutions are becoming increasingly important for channelling government 
development activity, but the main decision making power still rests with the bureaucracy. The 
regional leadership (in this case a minister of the state) has a close working relationship with the 
Collector. Strengthening district level democratic institutions would require capacity building of its 
elected members and improving accountability of bureaucrats to elected officials. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Manor. J. (1995) Democratic Decentralisation in Africa and Asia, IDS Bulletin 26 (2), pp81-88. 
7 Blair. (2000) 
Local Governance and Rural Non-Farm Economy 
NRI and Debate 30
4.3 Block/Janpad Level Analysis  
Janpad Panchayat 
The study visited four JPs in the two selected districts: Gotegaon and Chichli in Narsimhapur district 
and Bhimpur and Betul in the district of Betul. As shown in Fig.3.1, the main state functionaries at 
this level are the CEO, a direct government appointee, and the Block Development Officer (BDO). 
The CEO sits in on Janpad meetings. The BDO reports to the CEO and the DRDA and is responsible 
for implementing and co-ordinating all centrally sponsored schemes. He is assisted by field extension 
officers and Gram Sahayeks (village level assistants). The BDO is also expected to work closely with 
the Janpad Panchayat. This study looked at the planning activities of the JP and its relationships with 
the line departments and gram Panchayats. 
 
1. Planning Process 
The information collected from these two JP revealed that as in the case of ZP, no planning activity 
has been taking place. The discussions at the regular meetings of the General Assembly and Standing 
Committees related to use of funds already earmarked under different schemes. 
 
Table 4.5 Implementation of the Panchayat Act at Janpad Panchayat level in Betul and       
     Narsimhapur districts  
Narsimhapur District Betul District Provisions of the act 
Gotegaon Block Chichli Block Bhimpur Block Betul Block 
Meeting of General 
Assembly being held 
regularly 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Meeting of standing 
committees being held 
regularly 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Funds received during 
2001-02 
EAS; JGSY; 
SJGSY; Pensions; 
Tribal sub-plan; 
10th Finance 
Commission; MP 
and MLA Fund 
EAS; JGSY; 
SJGSY; 
Pensions; Tribal 
sub-plan; 10th 
Finance 
Commission; MP 
and MLA Fund 
EAS; JGSY; 
SJGSY; 
Pensions; Tribal 
sub-plan; 10th 
Finance 
Commission; 
MP and MLA 
Fund 
EAS; JGSY; 
SJGSY; 
Pensions; Tribal 
sub-plan; 10th 
Finance 
Commission; 
MP and MLA 
Fund 
Annual plan for 2002-
03 prepared 
No No No No 
 
According to the acts governing local government institutions the JP is expected to: 
¨ consolidate the annual plan prepared by GP in to annual plan for the JP; 
¨ prepare annual plan for economic development and social justice for matters entrusted to it by 
the state government or the ZP; and 
¨ undertake regional planning and infrastructural development within the JP area. 
 
Detailed discussions with JP representatives and the government officials at the block level confirmed 
the above findings.  
¨ Currently the JPs consolidate demands prepared by the GP. This consolidation is largely a 
totalling exercise of the demands sent in by the GP/Gram Sabha for IAY beneficiaries and in 
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various categories of pensions and social security benefits. Since the GPs have not undertaken 
any serious planning exercise the JPs restrict themselves to ‘summing up’ the demands of the 
GPs.  
 
¨ The government has entrusted the JP to plan for EAS and SJGSY. The JPs have been more 
involved in the decision making for these schemes. The JPs have prepared the annual action 
plan for activities under the EAS scheme. These relate largely to watershed management 
activities. In case of SJGSY the JPs approved the list of activities identified by the Block level 
Coordination Committee of the scheme.  
 
¨ The JP in neither of the districts has undertaken any exercise in terms of regional planning and 
infrastructural development.  
 
2 Coordination with line departments  
JP has been entrusted with monitoring of the progress of schemes related to the functions that have 
been transferred to the Panchayat sector. The government has prepared an 11-point monitoring format 
that is to be submitted for consideration to the JP. However, the study found that the monitoring 
information under the 11-point format is not being shared with the JP. This information is being 
directly sent through the department channel to the district and is being discussed with the 
Departmental Head at the distric t level and with the District Collector.  
 
As at the district level, the line departments are represented in the JP in the seven standing 
committees. The JP members report that more often than not the officials excuse themselves from 
these meetings on grounds that they have been called at the district for some purpose or the other. 
There is no monitoring of the number of meetings of JP attended by the block officials within the 
departmental assessment.  
 
The JPs do not have substantive powers to instruct the line departments in the performance of their 
functions. As a result they are unable to assert their views on the officials. The JP members have to 
rely on the district officials or the ZP members to get a favourable hearing of their arguments.  
 
3 Coordination with Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha  
Under the state act on Panchayat the JP has the responsibility to coordinate and guide the GPs. This 
implies that the JP maintains active links with the GPs and assists them in the preparation of plans and 
during the implementation of various schemes.  
 
The JP members reported they are not aware of their role as coordinator and guide to the GP. 
Whatever interaction takes place between the Sarpanch and the Janpad member is informal in nature 
and is generally in the nature of advice to the former. There is also apparent confusion about how the 
further devolution of power to village committees under the Gram Swaraj Act affected the functional 
relationships between Janpad Panchayat and Gram Panchayats. 
 
Summing up: The national legislation required the creation of a three-tier system. However, its scope 
to influence decision-making is limited to two schemes. JP’s principal role is to channel information 
from village to district level, yet elected members are not aware of their role as coordinators of village 
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level institutions. Their relatively low information base, gives added grounds to the government 
officials to overlook the views of the JP. 
 
Though the DRDA and the JP have been merged all decisions regarding implementation of 
development schemes and projects are effectively taken by the DRDA and implemented by the BDO. 
The officials from the line departments simply by-pass the JP members.  
 
Overall, it appears that the role of the Janpad is becoming increasingly irrelevant in the context of the 
Government development activity channelled through District level bodies and line departments and 
supposed delegation of responsibility to village level institutions.  
 
4.4 Village Level Analysis  
4.4.1 Gram Panchayat 
As at the higher levels, the role of GP is to prepare annual plan for economic development and social 
justice; coordinate the activities of Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat; and to monitor and evaluate the 
activities of Gram Sabha.  
 
Planning Process 
There is considerable confusion as to what functions the different elected bodies are expected to 
perform. In the 8 GPs visited by the study team, none had prepared annual plans. The Sarpanch, the 
Panchayat Secretary and the members of the GPs reported that after the State Act Amendment in 2001 
they are not expected to undertake any planning exercise. Neither had these GPs prepared their annual 
budget. The representatives and the functionaries were of the view that it is the Gram Sabha that is 
now responsible for preparing the annual plan. According to the Amendment new planning powers 
have been given to the Gram Sabha. The Gram Panchayat is still required to prepare the annual 
village plan with participation from, and monitoring by, the Gram Sabha. It is clear that multiplicity of 
legislation is causing much confusion. 
 
Implementation  
The GPs directly implement the money that is being received under the Basic Services Programme. 
Under this programme the 8 GPs visited have undertaken construction activity like road construction, 
repair of school building, water tank construction, paving of tiles on the road etc. 
 
The cashbook and the accounts of all the GPs reveal that money under IAY and Pensions has been 
received by the GP during the past one year. These funds are sent directly to the beneficiary, by-
passing the Gram Sabha. The Gram Sabha, however, has selected the beneficiary for these schemes. 
The process of selecting beneficiaries is discussed below.  
 
Linkages with Line Departments and Projects  
The departments and the Mission-led projects are not linked to the GP in any way. Neither the money 
under the schemes of the department(s) nor decisions of the department or projects are part of the 
Gram Panchayat institution. As a result the Gram Panchayat representatives are not aware of the 
schemes that have been implemented in the villages under the GP, or the beneficiaries that have been 
selected under these schemes. Consequently, GP has not been able to link itself and add value to the 
scheme that has been implemented by the departments and the projects. 
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Monitoring the Gram Sabha 
The GP representatives were unaware that of the monitoring mechanism that has been 
institutionalised between the Gram Sabha and the GP. As such the representatives reported they have 
not undertaken any monitoring of activities of the Gram Sabha or its standing committees. 
 
4.4.2  Gram Sabha 
The study covered 8 Gram Sabhas in the two districts of Betul and Narsimhapur. Among these, two 
Gram Sabhas are in Schedule V area, namely, Khatapani and Hirdi of Bhimpur block. The position 
with respect to the implementation of different provisions of the act is shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Implementation of the State Act at Gram Sabha level in Betul and Narsimhapur   
     Districts  
Provisions of the act Narsimhapur Betul 
 Parasw
ada 
Jhoteshw
ar 
B
atesra 
D
ahalw
ada 
K
hatapani 
H
irdi 
R
atanpur 
C
how
ki 
Formation of standing committees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Appointment of Treasurer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Opening of bank account Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gram Sabha being held regularly No No No No No No No No 
Annual Plan prepared No No No No No No No No 
Meeting of standing committees being held  No No No No No No No No 
Money/grant received under any scheme of 
government or by GP 
No No No No No No No No 
 
Table 4.6 shows that the Gram Sabhas have done little more than constitute the standing committees 
and appoint officials. The Sarpanchs and the Panchayat Secretaries of the different villages reported 
that due to lack of quorum the Gram Sabha meetings are not being held regularly. According to them 
the condition requiring 20 per cent of the voters of the village to be present pose practical problems. 
As a result the meetings are announced but are adjourned due to lack of quorum. On the other hand 
the villagers note that they are not given enough notice about when the meeting is scheduled. 
Furthermore, attending meetings often mean loss of income for casual worker and for the self 
employed. The initial enthusiasm to attend meeting has waned due to lack of feedback and interaction 
with the Panchayat members.  
 
Additionally, the standing committees do not meet regularly either. None of the villages reported any 
meetings of the standing committees so far. On random inquiry in the villages, the team found that the 
members of Gram Sabha could not recollect the names of different members of the standing 
committees or the names of the Presidents of the committees.  
 
As Table 4.6 show all Gram Sabhas have been opened bank accounts with the money allocated for the 
purpose by the Gram Panchayat. Till January 2002, none of the Gram Sabhas had received any money 
under any of the schemes or grants in aid from the government. This means that no planning activities 
could take place even if the gram Sabha wanted to. 
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Summing up: the state government has through multiple legislations devolved considerable power to 
the village level institutions. However, this is causing confusing about the division of, sharing of, 
power between the GP and the Gram Sabha. As at two higher levels, only limited planning activity is 
taking place.  
 
The relationships between the Gram Sabhas and their Panchayats have weakened over time as there 
has been little interaction between the two and participation rates in meetings have declined. This has 
allowed the Sarpanch and the Panchayat secretaries a free hand. 
 
The creation of parallel committees by donor projects and central government projects could in the 
long run undermine the position of the GP. It also deprives them of the opportunity to gain experience 
in project implementation. 
4.5 Summary of findings 
 
Decentralisation of Power 
¨ The state act on Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj takes forward the national agenda for 
decentralised governance and provides legal status to Gram Sabha in all villages of the state. 
The decision-making mechanism has also been institutionalised through the constitution of 
standing committees of Gram Sabha. The corresponding devolution of administrative powers 
that have been affected through departmental orders has theoretically strengthened the position 
of PRIs and the Gram Sabha in the state. In fact, the act attempts to generate an enabling 
environment for the communities to institutionalise self-governing systems. 
 
¨ Effective power is at the district level with the bureaucrats. This is important to note as these 
institutions are becoming increasingly important for channelling government development 
activity.  
 
¨ Field information showed that at all three levels elected members are in place in accordance to 
the provisions in the state act. Women, schedule tribe and caste groups are also represented as 
per the regulations. At all levels the PRIs had also appointed the officials. These reflect a 
realignment of power rather than shift of power. 
 
The creation of these new democratic institutions and has not eroded the traditional rural power. 
It is shifting and re-aligning to maintain its position in the emerging political order. The old 
power groups/individuals have legitimised their power by becoming elected members or by 
backing those who are willing to act as a front. The later is common in areas where the general 
castes dominate and seats are reserved for the minority Schedule Tribes and Castes and Other 
Backward Castes. The gender relations have not altered either. In a majority of cases, the 
husband of the women member/leader runs the show. This raises questions of accountability 
between elected member and the electorate.  
 
Accountability 
¨ The state government has divided the functions and functionaries between Panchayats and state 
sector to strengthen PRIs, especially the Gram Sabha. However, as also noted in other research 
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(Manor: 1995,2000; Blair: 2000), the loyalties and allegiances of the functionaries allocated to 
the Panchayat sector remain with the state administrative sector. This is primarily because they 
see these district postings as temporary and rely on their departmental line managers for career 
progression. This requires a critical change in attitude and orientation of bureaucrats. Perhaps 
the criteria for assessment of performance of officials and their monitoring system should also 
be reviewed to note the level of support provided to PRIs. Alternatively, the less perfect 
comprise model working in Karnataka could be looked at.  
 
Not interested in good governance  
¨ The elected members at all three levels of PRI, while aware of the powers devolved to them, 
are clearly not fully informed about their expected roles and functions. It also seems that little 
effort has been made to learn the procedures, processes and guidelines for local governance. 
Part of this problem could be attributed to the confusion that stems from the various 
amendments to the state act. The other reasons are: they do not see the need to do so, as they 
rely on the other social and traditional network. This point is elaborated in the next chapter.  
 
The continued dominance of the traditional power groups in the democratic institutions means 
that elected members, particularly the Presidents (Sarpanch) of the Panchayats very often rely 
on already existing social and economic network and patronage. This has two effects. One, the 
Panchayat leaders interact informally, without informing other members. Two, they do not see 
the need to engage fully with the democratic processes or provide feedback to the lower level 
institutions. 
 
Development schemes and projects  
¨ One of the principal functions of the PRIs is to draw up annual plans for their respective areas. 
None of the Panchayats have so far undertaken any planning activity. This is explained by the 
fact that most development schemes are top-down and inflexible, giving the Panchayats limited 
scope for planning; and by the limited planning capability of the Panchayats.  
 
¨ A large number of projects are being run by different donor agencies and line departments. All 
have set up separate structures for project implementation without involving the Panchayats. 
This has further limited opportunities for gaining experience in project implementation. 
 
Developing new non-farm activities 
¨ It is clear that planning capability is poorly developed at all levels of the PRIs. It is also 
apparent that except for implementing the projects funded by the Basic Services scheme, the 
Janpad and Gram Panchayats have little experience in executing projects. Even at the district 
level the administrators and politicians work within the framework of schemes determined at 
national level. Any policy intervention for promoting non-farm/economic activities working 
through PRIs must be preceded by capacity building among legitimate elected members.  
 
 
There are no major developmental activities taking place under the various schemes through the 
PRIs. The village level institutions are more familiar with the soft components of development. 
There is no experience or capability among PRIs to promote new economic activities. These 
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institutions could increase the uptake on health, education, local infrastructural and 
environmental programmes, by making it possible to adapt programmes to local conditions and 
preferences. These are fundamental to promoting non-farm activities.  
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5.  Village level: Socio-political Realities and Local Governance 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter shows that the Panchayat Raj not only attempts to devolve power to the lower 
levels it also incorporates an elaborate system of positive discrimination to counter the traditional 
power relations in the village. While the balance of power has not changed, the interface between the 
traditional power structures and members of those groups considered vulnerable and disadvantaged 
are changing. Some power sharing taking place. However, this is accompanied by realignment of 
power and politics of co-option. 
 
This chapter seeks to understand these relationships and the interface and how this affects the 
functioning of local government institutions. It focuses on assessing these relationships at the village 
and Gram Panchayat level. The power play that affects the decision-making process is much more 
visible at the village level through the GP and the Gram Sabha. 
 
Source of power in rural India lies in access to land, caste and proximity to state power structure. In 
this context, sections 5.2 and 5.3 analyses the socio-political profiles in the eight study villages, while 
section 5.4 looks at the impact of this on the functioning of the PRIs.  
5.2  Social and Political Profiles of Study Villages 
 
5.2.1 Power dynamics in the village society 
A village is as much a political entity as it is a social and economic unit. The politics in the village is 
generally defined in terms of caste; landownership and nearness to state.  
¨ Caste 
In villages that are inhabited by heterogeneous caste groups the factor of dominant caste comes in to 
play. The dominance can be in three ways: (i) in terms of number (i.e. majority); (ii) in terms of 
upper-lower caste; and (iii) caste dominance at the macro level (in the block/ district). It is difficult to 
generalise that the majority caste and/or the upper caste will always dominate in the. An important 
factor as to the caste that will dominate will also depend on the historical factors in the village. 
 
¨ Landownership or wealth 
Focus groups defined economic wealth in the village in terms of land holding. In the event of skewed 
distribution of landholding the dominance in decision-making in the village is in favour of big 
landowners. Their dominance works in two ways: (i) by providing employment to the landless and to 
small and marginal farmers in the village, that is, as an employer; and (ii) as the provider of credit to 
the households in terms of distress and even for making investments on their land.  
 
¨ Nearness to the state  
In case a member of the household is appointed as a government representative (Patel-revenue officer 
or Teacher) the dominant position of that particular household undergoes a qualitative change. This is 
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so because the household is perceived closer to the state and hence capable of securing state 
patronage in terms of benefits under different schemes of the government. 
 
These three factors come in to play in different proportions. It is possible that one or few households 
is/are able to command dominance on account of all or any of the above factors.  
 
The present study did not dwell on the sources of power in the village as such, but used the above 
categories to classify households or group of households. Additionally, focus groups were asked to 
identify the person/group that influenced decision-making in the village. Once the person(s) were 
identified then the field team collected information on the extent of dominance and the manner in 
which the decision-making in the GP and the Gram Sabha are affected. 
5.2.2  Sources of Power in the Village  
Narsimhapur District 
 
The socio-political profile of the villages in Narsimhapur is illustrated in Table 4.2. 
Table 5.1 Socio-politico Profile of Villages Studied in Narsimhapur District 
Gotegaon Block Chichli Block Social aspects 
Paraswada Jhoteshwar Batesra Dahalwada 
OBC UC  UC UC 
(a) Brahmin 20 
OBC 
(a) Rajput 
(b) Brahmin 
15 
7 
(a) Rajput 
(b) Brahmin 
90 
1 
(a) Patel 
(b) Sahu 
(c) Yadav 
14 
6 
8 (b) Carpenter 5 OBC OBC 
ST SC 
(d) Gond 4 (c) Mehra 1 
ST 
(d) Gond 10 
(a) Barber 
(b) Carpenter 
(c) B Smith 
(d) Potter 
2 
4 
1 
2 
SC 
(e) Cobbler 3 
ST 
(c) Patel 
(d) Gardner 
(e) Carpenter 
(f) B.Smith 
(g) W.Carrier 
(h) Tailor 
(i) Barber 
(j) Yadav 
(k) Kaurav 
(l) Kushwaha 
20 
5 
4 
3 
8 
4 
2 
1 
3 
3 
(f) Gond 15 
SC 
(m) Sarma 
(n) Cobblers 
7 
4 
ST 
Caste composition 
of the villages 
(figures indicate 
total no. of 
households). 
 
 
 
 
 
(o) Gond 20 
 
Land Distribution Land distribution 
is in favour of 
Sahus 
Land distribution in 
favour of Gonds 
Rajput, Brahmin, 
Sarma and Patel 
have land in the 
village around 40-60 
acres per family 
Rajputs control 70 
per cent of 
agriculture land and 
SC and ST own 30 
percent of land in 
the village 
Largest 
landholder in the 
village 
Person from Sahu 
caste (OBC) is the 
largest landholder- 
160 acre 
Person belonging to 
Gond tribe is the 
largest landholder 
(ST) - 5 acres 
Person belonging to 
Rajput caste (UC) 
holds maximum land 
in the village- 60 
Person belonging to 
Rajput caste (UC) is 
the biggest landlord 
in the village- 70 
Local Governance and Rural Non-Farm Economy 
NRI and Debate 39
Gotegaon Block Chichli Block Social aspects 
Paraswada Jhoteshwar Batesra Dahalwada 
acres acres 
Landless in the 
village 
Gonds do not have 
any land 
Brahmins and OBC Yadav, Barber and 
Potter in the OBC do 
not have any land. 
Gond among ST do 
not have any land. 
One Rajput family 
does not have any 
land. 
As such there are 
no landless in the 
village 
Persons in 
government 
service 
None from the 
village is in 
government 
service 
None form the 
village was reported 
as having joined 
government service 
Persons from 7 
families in the 
village have joined 
government service 
in various capacities. 
No person from the 
village has been 
reported to have 
joined government 
service. 
Persons in private 
service 
None reported Brahmins are 
employed by the 
Ashram and are 
teachers in the 
private school. 
None reported None reported 
Situational 
context of the 
village 
Manegaon the GP 
headquarter plays 
an important part 
in the life of the 
village at 
Paraswada 
Presence of Ashram 
at Jhoteshwar is 
critical in decision-
making in the village 
The village is near 
the junction of three 
blocks of the district 
and is half a 
kilometre away from 
the block 
headquarters at 
Kareli. 
Big village with 
sufficient 
infrastructural 
facilities like bank, 
post office, middle 
school and close to 
the block 
headquarter. 
Source: Field survey conducted by the team (December 01-January 02). 
 
All study villages in Narsimhapur are socially heterogeneous, that is, they are multi-caste villages, 
though Paraswada is comprised only of OBC and ST households. In Jhoteshwar there is a large 
community of Brahmins but the main landowners are the Gonds. The two villages in the Chichi block 
are essentially dominated by the Rajputs.  
 
 Generally, the caste of the household also defines their occupation in the village. For example, the 
Vishwakarma at Jhoteshwar, Batesra and Dahalwada are involved in carpentry, which is their 
traditional occupation.  
 
In relating village households’ caste, access to land and proximity to state power structure and 
influence on decision-making the following observations can be made. 
 
¨ Caste and power 
In all villages, the person (group) identified by the villagers as dominating decision-making process 
belonged to upper castes residing in the same village. At Paraswada village (comprised of OBC and 
ST) the person holding sway over the decisions in the village was located at the Panchayat 
headquarter in Manegaon.  
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¨ Land ownership and power 
With agriculture the prime activity, availability and ownership of land is decisive for locating 
economic power in the village. Rajputs, the large landowners in Batesra and Dahalwada, form the 
dominant group.  In Jhoteshwar, though the Gonds are the main landowners, the Brahmins are the 
principal power brokers. The latter are closely associated with the Ashram, an important local player. 
The pattern of land ownership among the OBC, SC and ST is more complex. 
 
§ Landlessness among STs: The STs (Gonds) were found in all the villages visited by the team. 
At Paraswada and Batesra, the Gonds had originally come to the village to work as labourers on 
the farms of large landlords. Over the years, they have settled down in the village and have 
become permanent residents. In Jhoteshwar and Dahalwada they do own some agriculture land. 
Interviews revealed that the original residents of these two villages had been Gonds. In fact at 
Dahalwada it was reported that till 1946, most of the land had belonged to the Gonds in the area. 
But during the interim period (1946-47) when the Government of India was taking over, the 
records were changed and the persons from the Upper Caste became landlord with Gonds shown 
as marginal or small landowners in official records. 
 
§ Land ownership among OBCs : Members of OBC were present in all villages. However, none 
owned land in Jhoteshwar and Batesra. In case of former these families belonged to the caste of 
carpenters and in case of Batesra they belonged to a range of caste that was traditionally 
involved in off-farm activities, namely Yadavs (dairying), Barbers and Potters. Other OBCs, 
like Patels, Sahus and Gardners, were involved in land-based activities and were therefore 
owned land. 
 
§ Landlessness among SCs : There were SC families in the three villages of Jhoteshwar, Batesra 
and Dahalwada. These SC families were traditionally cobblers. However, following the 
government programme of distribution of surplus land to the SC these families have come to 
acquire some land and are not landless in the strict sense of the terms.  
 
§ Landlessness among the UCs : In Jhoteshwar the Brahmins were attracted by the activities 
of the ashram and have migrated from nearby areas to settle in the village. These Brahmins are 
primarily employed as teachers in the Sanskrit School of the village and do not own any land. In 
Batesra, one Rajput household was reported to be landless mainly because the head of 
household had sold off his land to repay debts that he had incurred to cater to his addiction to 
alcohol. 
 
§ Landholding: There is a wide difference between the largest landholding in the three villages 
where the UC or the OBC belonged to the group of large land owners (Paraswada, Batesra and 
Dahalwada) and Jhoteshwar where the STs were large landowners. In case of former the large 
landlords has more than 50 acres of land where as in Jhoteshwar the largest landlord, a Gond, 
had 5 acre of land. 
 
¨ Proximity to s tate 
A few people from Batesra were employed by the state. They belonged to the UC group that was 
identified by interviewees as having influence in village decision-making. 
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The persons (groups) identified as influential in the villages at Narsimhapur are described in Table 5.3 
 
Table 5.2 Characteristics of Influential Persons Identified in the Villages of Narsimhapur  
  District 
 
In Narsimhapur, the sources of power and influence still lies in the traditional mix of upper caste, 
higher economic class (potential to provide employment to others), and proximity to government. 
Membership of PRI has not generated a new source of power. On the contrary, the traditional power 
groups continue their economic dominance and political control, and as in the case of 
Manegaon/Paraswada (Table 5.3) the position has been legitimised by becoming an elected official. In 
fact there has been little or no empowerment of the disadvantaged and economically backward groups 
Village Characteristics of the person identified as most influential 
Paraswada/
Manegaon 
§ The influential person identified at Manegaon was Mr Yogendra Singh. He belongs to upper 
caste and is the largest landowner of the village. A person from the same family was 
Minister at the state level 8/10 years ago. Mr Yogendra Singh is the Deputy Chairperson of 
the Janpad Panchayat at Gotegaon. He is also the Block President of Congress Party. 
§ Mr Yogendra Singh provides employment to a number of households in the village. 
§ The influence of the family goes beyond the Manegaon to Paraswada as well. The people at 
Paraswada reported the influence of Mr Yogendra Singh in matters concerning the village. 
Jhoteshwar § The Ashram at Jhoteshwar is the symbol of influence in the village and the Panchayat. The 
Ashram was established by Swami Swaroopanand and has the distinction of being visited by 
the then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi and the present Chief Minister Mr Digvijay 
Singh. In addition, number of distinguished visitors from political parties and administration 
frequent the Ashram. 
§ Ashram provides employment to a number of households of the villages.  
§ Ashram holds bhandara  (free community meals) every day that can be attended by anyone. 
This provides food security to the villagers. 
§ Swamiji is accessible to all the households in the village. He also entertains requests and 
applications from the households seeking favours/benefits for the households. 
Batesra § The village is heterogeneous in terms of caste composition. The dominant group in the 
village is that of Rajputs (UC). Within Rajputs it is difficult to specify the person or the 
family whose opinion is critical in decision-making. 
§ The villagers also identified the moneylenders of Kareli as also exerting their influence in 
the village. However, this influence is often channelised through the dominant 
group(Rajputs) 
§ As a group the Rajputs own three-fourth of land in the village and provide employment to a 
large number of families. 
§ The Upper Caste group is perceived to be closer to the government officials and has 
alliances with political parties as well. This group also has access to information and 
benefits over government schemes and programmes. 
Dahalwada § Rajputs by virtue of their upper caste status and their economic status are the dominant 
group in the village. Within Rajputs the largest landholder is the traditional leader of the 
village and has his say in most of the decision-making process of the village. 
§ Rajputs provide employment and credit to the households in the village. They also help the 
families in distress through donations or loans at low rates of interest. 
§ The Rajputs have access to information and the mechanism that provides benefit from 
government schemes.  
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as their leadership has been co-opted into main stream politics which still serves the interests of 
better-off groups. 
 
Crucially for promoting new economic activities, the study shows that in rural MP caste still 
determines the economic occupation of individuals and households. However, when individuals move 
to higher level settlements they often take up activities which they are unable to pursue in their own 
village/milieu, primarily because caste is less of an issue in urban area. The implications for 
development of RNFE are twofold. One, promoting activities based on traditional caste based skills 
will only go to reinforcing an undemocratic system; and two; that higher level settlements may be 
better entry points for promoting RNFE.  
 
Betul  District 
Table 5.3 Socio -political Profile of Villages studied in Betul District 
Bhimpur Block Betul Block Social aspects 
Khatapani Hirdi  Ratanpur Chowki 
ST ST ST ST 
Gonds 50 Gond 
Korku 
99 
10 
Gond 
Korku 
54 
4 OBC 
Gond 
Korku 
137 
6 
OBC OBC OBC 
B.Smith 3 Kalar 20 
SC 
Blacksmith 
Yadav 
2 
1 
Mahar 5 
Sahu 
W.Man 
Kunbi 
Pawar 
B.s mith 
10 
4 
2 
2 
1 
SC 
SC Mahar 4 
Mahar 2 
Caste 
composition of 
the villages 
(figures in 
brackets indicate 
the total no. of 
households) 
 
 
 
  
 
Land 
Distribution 
Large landlords are 
Gonds in the village 
Large landlords are 
Gonds in the village 
Large landlords are 
Gonds in the village 
Large landlords are 
Gonds in the village 
Largest 
landholder in the 
village 
Gond Gond Gond Gond 
Landless in the 
village 
OBC are landless in 
the village 
Landlessness in all 
caste and tribes 
Landlessness 
among all caste and 
tribes 
Substantial proportion 
of households belongs 
to the landless 
category. They are 
dependent on labour 
for their survival. 
Persons in 
government 
service 
No persons is 
employed in 
government service 
No person was 
reported to be in 
government service 
No person was 
reported to be in 
government service 
No person was 
reported to be in 
government service 
Situational 
context of the 
village 
Located within the 
forest area 
Situated on the 
main road and 
linked to both 
Bhimpur, Chichli 
and Betul blocks 
Ratanpur is 
relatively isolated 
because of poor 
road connectivity. 
Situated in the forest. 
Large number of 
households dependent 
on wage labour. 
 
Table 5.3 shows that villages in Betul are predominantly tribal villages. The main tribal groups in 
these villages are Gonds and Korkus. The study team found that these tribal groups socially 
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differentiate between each other as much as they make distinction between the tribal and non-tribal 
groups. Furthermore, the Gonds normally do not eat with Korkus, there is no inter-marriage between 
these groups, and the social interaction is essentially at occupational or professional level. The Gonds 
believe that they are the protectors and prefer themselves to be called as Gond Thakurs, the same title 
that is used by Rajputs elsewhere. The Korkus have traditionally relied on a forest-based economy; 
though they have now been settled through government settlement schemes. However, considerable 
traditional knowledge has been lost in the process. 
 
In addition to the STs, there were families belonging to the OBC and SC inhabiting the four study 
villages. These villages appear less heterogeneous than those in Narsimhapur. However, the 
communities themselves would describe their villages as socially heterogeneous. 
 
In relating village households’ caste, access to land and proximity to state power structure and 
influence on decision-making the following observations can be made. 
 
¨ Caste/tribe and influence : 
In all the villages the power and influence was exerted by Gonds as a group. This is because they have 
a majority in terms of numbers in all the four villages. They are also the largest landowners. 
 
¨ Land ownership and power 
In the villages of Betul there was a certain degree of unwillingness to share information on 
landholding with the team. This was because (i) the land has not been regularised for most of the 
households; and (ii) most of the families were cultivating encroached lands. As a result, the team 
found out that the community is either giving wrong data on the land that is under their possession or 
is unwilling to share the information. Consequently, the team resorted to ranking to assess the largest 
landholder and the persons not possessing land, instead of computing landholding of families and 
identifying the largest landholder. 
 
In all the villages the Gonds were identified as the largest landholder of land in the village. 
Households from all castes were found in the landless category in these villages. 
 
¨ Land and influence :  
Though Gonds were the largest landowners in the study villages, in none of the villages did the 
community feel that the power of the group emanates from land ownership. It is important to note 
here that agriculture is not the mainstay of the economy in these villages. Migration for wage labour is 
an important source of income. As Table 5.5 shows association with PRI, political activism and 
traditional leadership role were more important in defining power structures in predominantly tribal 
and forest-based economy. This shows that devolution of power and the increased scope for 
participating in local governance has created alternative channels of influence. However, the case of 
Babu Singh in Chowki village (Table 5.5) shows there has been a merger of traditional and 
democratic roles. This could work two ways. This could either enable him to strengthen his hold on 
the community or he could use his informal network to improve the lot of the community. 
 
¨ Proximity to state and influence : 
In none of the four villages in Betul was any person employed in government service. 
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Table 5.4 Characteristics of Influential Persons Identified in the Villages of Betul District 
Village Characteristics of the Influential Persons 
Khatapani ¨ Treasurer of the Gram Sabha was identified with maximum influence in the village. 
¨ Premlal (Treasurer) belonged to Gond tribal group and had studied (ST) up to higher 
secondary level. He does not possess any land. 
¨ The power of Premlal emanates from his literacy and from the information he possesses 
about various government schemes. 
Hirdi  ¨ Dilip a person belonging to OBC caste group and who works as a freelance journalist and 
who is an active member of a political party was identified to form and change people’s 
opinion in the village. 
Ratanpur ¨ For internal matters of the tribal group the Patel was identified as influential where as for 
other matters it was the Panchayat Secretary who had considerable influence in the village.  
¨ The Panchayat Secretary belongs to the OBC caste group and was reported to have 
knowledge about the Panchayat and functioning of Gram Sabha. He is also reported to 
reject decisions of the Gram Sabha if he thinks that they are not taken according to the 
guidelines of the government or have led to improper selection of the beneficiary. 
Chowki ¨ Babu Singh (ST) of the village is both the tribal head as well as the Chairperson of the GP. 
He holds considerable power because of his recognition among the tribal group as their 
traditional leader and as the leader of the Panchayat. 
 
Table 5.4 shows that there are two sources of power and influence in the villages of Betul. One, 
related to internal matters of the tribal group, e.g. disputes in marriage, property, etc. In such cases the 
tribal head was found to be influential. The second level of influence is related to matters concerning 
the entire village e.g. location of hand pump, construction paved roads etc. In such cases the response 
of the villages was different. In Khatapani and Chowki it was a person belonging to Gond tribe who 
was identified as influential where as in Hirdi and Ratanpur it was a person belonging to the OBC 
caste group. 
 
Expectedly, Betul shows that when the economy is not so strongly grounded in agriculture, 
landownership is not a source of power. Traditional power is created by the social structure. It has, so 
far survived, and functions as a parallel structure. Betul also illustrates that democratic structures have 
taken root more easily. Literacy and political activism allow access to alternative channels of power.  
 
Long term migration is undertaken by most household. This also contributes to the looser power 
relations in the village as household are less dependent on village resources. Some migrants are also 
engaged in non-farm activities in the destination region. For these workers to be attracted by new 
forms non-farm activities, the latter would have to generate considerably more income. 
 
5.3  Betul and Narsimhapur: A Comparison 
A comparison of the sources of power in the community in Betul and Narsimhapur reveal the 
following: 
(i) Importance of agriculture : In Narsimhapur agriculture plays a key role in the economy of the 
village and the household. The land is fertile and farmers take two to three crops in a year. This 
generates sufficient employment within the village. In terms of sources of power the larger the 
landholding the greater is the power of the family due to its ability to provide employment locally to 
households. 
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In Betul, land is of a poor quality and is not as fertile as in Narsimhapur. Most of the families tend to 
migrate for long duration. This implies that agriculture is not critical for survival of the family and 
consequently the source of power is not dependent on the size of holding. 
 
(ii) Caste and class: In Narsimhapur the caste and class status of families merge to reinforce the  
sources of power within the community. In Betul the caste factor comes into play in deciding the 
majority group in the village. Gonds have demonstrated unity in decision making on account of their 
sheer majority in the villages. 
 
(iii) PRIs: In Betul district in three out of four villages a Panchayat representative or functionary was 
identified to influence decision-making in the village. No such persons were identified in 
Narsimhapur. 
 
(iv) Relative Isolation: In Betul the villagers are relatively isolated and have a poor road 
connectivity. The community is fairly independent and does not have to visit the block or government 
offices frequently. This downplays the importance of government offices in the eyes of the villager. 
For the villager, power and patronage now lies with the Sarpanch/Secretary who is accessible in the 
village, hence, the importance of the PRI functionaries in the village. At Narsimhapur, the villages are 
accessible and the villagers can, and do, go to the government offices for various purposes. As a result 
the nearness to government functionaries is an important factor that creates power sources in the 
village. 
 
(v) Migration: In the villages in Betul a large proportion of families migrate to other district for long 
periods during the year. This decreases the importance of the power sources that are located in the 
village, as the families do not have to interact with these sources for a major part of the year. At 
Narsimhapur, the migration is to nearby villages and for short durations. These families are in contact 
with the village and its dynamics through out the year. The community at Narsimhapur is therefore 
highly receptive to the opinions and interests of the powerful person(s). 
5.4 Power Dynamics and its Influence on PRIs 
The discussions with members of Gram Sabha and the Panchayat representatives and functionaries 
identified the following ways in which the decisions of the Gram Sabha and the Gram Panchayat are 
influenced by the powers centres in the village: 
 
1. Electoral Politics  
The community reported that the power sources in the village strongly influence the process of 
electoral politics. This influence is generally asserted at the time of choosing candidates who will 
stand for elections. 
 
Narsimhapur: At Manegaon and Jhoteshwar the members of GP and the Sarpanch had been elected 
un-opposed during the elections in 1994 and 2000. There was, however, difference in which the 
influence was exerted in these two villages.  
 
In Jhoteshwar the ashram spread the message that there should not be dissension among the 
community on account of elections in the community. Therefore the villagers should select the ward 
members and Sarpanch without resorting to elections. This, the ashram, argued was to maintain peace 
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and harmony in the village. Consequently, in both the elections the community selected the ward 
members and the Sarpanch and no elections were held. 
 
At Manegaon the powerful family from the village decided on who should be member from each of 
the wards and the person who should be the Sarpanch during both the elections. These nominations 
were accepted by the community (there was no dissent!), and the entire Gram Panchayat came in to 
being without resorting to electoral politics. Thus, in both Jhoteshwar and Manegaon strategies to 
undermine the democratic processes are being used to retain power. 
 
The powerful group in Batesra and Dahalwada played a key role in deciding the candidate for 
Panchayat elections. In fact, in both the villages the community reported that the person who was not 
supported by these groups eventually lost the election.  
 
Betul: The powerful groups and the persons identified by the community also decided the 
candidature for elections in the village. In case the candidate is opposed and another person also 
stands for elections then it is the person supported by the powerful group who eventually wins the 
elections.  
 
2. Membership in GP:   
There are two aspects to the membership in the PRIs. One is that the person acquires power after 
becoming the member of the PRI, as in case of Ratanpur and Khatapani in  Betul. This acquisition of 
power by individuals is by the fact that they are functionaries of the Panchayat institutions.  
 
The second aspect is whether the members from powerful families have become members of the 
PRIs. In Chowki in Betul the traditional head of the tribal group is also the Sarpanch. Similarly at 
Jhoteshwar, the Deputy Sarpanch was a member of the ashram. The members of GP at Jhoteshwar 
reported that no meeting of GP takes place in the absence of Deputy Sarpanch. Moreover the records 
of the GP are generally in the custody of the Deputy Sarpanch. 
 
As power groups have already chosen and ensured victory of their candidate before the elections, 
there is no question of rigging the election. It has been argued that this is the only option available to 
these power groups, in the context of the elaborate scheme of reservation that is provided in the act.  
 
What does all this imply for local governance? It was noted at the Gram Sabha level that the merger 
of traditional power groups/individuals into local government creates a strong network of contacts. 
Such ‘elected’ individuals usually bring with them a good informal network. They can draw on this to 
obtain funds more easily. In contrast, is the case of the truly elected Sarpanch in Adarsh Dhanora. He 
is a young graduate and a political activist with little economic clout. To be more effective, he had to 
eventually rely on the Panchayat secretary who had a better informal network. 
 
It is not surprising that the traditional power groups have acted to protect their influence; and that this 
has been done by providing strategic support to individuals before elections and thus co-option of 
their allegiance. What is interesting is the pragmatic view at the grassroots that it is the ability to 
deliver that is important. The fact that democratic power is being appropriated is less important.  
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3 Identification of BPL Families and Selection of Beneficiary for IAY, Pensions and 
 Family Benefit Schemes:  
The target group for these schemes are households below the officially defined poverty-line. It is the 
task of the Gram Panchayat to confirm the official list of households Below Poverty Line (BPL) in the 
village(s) under their jurisdiction. The beneficiaries for IAY, Pensions and Family Benefit Schemes 
can only be selected from this list. The process of identification of BPL families is through a survey 
that is conducted by government officials. A process of modifications and amendments to this list is 
undertaken by the GP and the Gram Sabha. It is at this stage that the powerful groups in the village 
exert their influence in finalising the modified list of BPL families. This basically involves including 
households Above the Poverty Line (APL). This diverts resources from poorer households and 
reduces the impact of government sponsored schemes.  
 
Additionally, it was reported by the community is that if the selection of the beneficiary is supported 
by the powerful group in the village, then the chances of receiving the money by the beneficiary is 
assured. The community and the beneficiary were silent when they were asked whether the selection 
involved any kickbacks to the person sponsoring them. 
 
3. Identification of activities by the Gram Panchayat 
The state act requires the Gram Sabha to approve the plan for the money received by the GP under 
different heads. Once the approval is secured then the money is drawn and spent accordingly. The 
powerful individuals and groups exert their influence at two levels: one, while the GP is weighing up 
the various works that it could undertake; and second, when the approval is being sought by the Gram 
Sabha. In Paraswada, Batesra and Dahalwada the community was unanimous that no work has been 
undertaken by the GP so far that has not been approved by the powerful group/family. In Jhoteshwar 
the GP takes its decision but consults the ashram before finalising its plan. Similarly in Betul the GP 
and the Gram Sabha always approve the plans proposed by the influential persons in the village. 
 
4 Selecting members for the standing committees of the Gram Swaraj:  
In Jhoteshwar, the community selected the members of the standing committee of the Gram Swaraj. 
The community reported that there was no influence of ashram in selection of members of the 
standing committees of the Gram Sabha. 
 
In other villages in the both the district the influential persons influenced the selection of the members 
of the standing committees of Gram Sabha. The community stated that these persons influenced the 
selection of the President of the Committee. The process of the selection of the treasurer of the Gram 
Sabha was strongly influenced by the powerful groups in these villages. 
 
5. Influencing opinions and perceptions in GP and Gram Swaraj 
A key role -played by the powerful groups in the village was formation of community opinion 
regarding the Gram Panchayat and the Gram Swaraj. The expressed opinion of these groups carries 
weight in forming the opinion of the community with respect to GP and the Gram Swaraj. In all the 
villages whenever the community member was asked ‘who told you or how did you arrive at the 
conclusion’ the power centre of the village were always named and identified. 
5.5 Summary of Findings  
 
Local Governance and Rural Non-Farm Economy 
NRI and Debate 48
Social, political and economic profiles at village level 
 
1. In Narsimhapur, a society grounded in agriculture, the sources of power and influence still 
lies in the traditional mix of upper caste, higher economic class (potential to provide 
employment to others), and proximity to government. Membership of PRI has not generated a 
new source of power. On the contrary, the traditional power groups continue their economic 
dominance and hence strong political control over the local population. For example, in 
Manegaon/Paraswada the position has been legitimised by becoming an elected official. In 
fact there has been little or no empowerment of the disadvantaged and economically 
backward groups as their leadership has been co-opted into main stream politics which still 
serves the interests of better-off groups. 
 
2. In Betul, less heterogeneous and dominated by tribal communities, rural economy relies on 
forest-based activities and long-term circular migration. Local leadership have only limited 
control over forest based activities, and migration means less dependence on local economy. 
Thus, the relationship between village leaders and the people are loose and weaker than those 
found in Narsimhapur.  
 
Contrary to Narsimhapur, traditional power created by social structures functions parallel to 
the new sources of power created by the electoral politics. The two operate in separate 
spheres. Democratic structures appear to take root more easily where the previous power 
relations were not tied to economic control. Literacy and political activism has allowed access 
to alternative channels of power and some degree of empowerment.  
 
3. Crucially for promoting new economic activities, the study shows that in rural MP caste still 
determines the economic occupation of individuals and households. However, when 
individuals move to higher level settlements they often take up activities which they are 
unable to pursue in their own village/milieu, primarily because caste is less of an issue in 
urban area. The implications for development of RNFE are twofold. One, promoting activities 
based on traditional caste based skills could go to reinforcing an undemocratic system; and 
two; that higher level settlements may be better entry points for promoting RNFE. 
 
Political relations, interface and accountability 
 
4. Incorporating the provisions for reservations in the state act did not ipso facto lead to the 
emergence of alternative, independent leadership in the villages in Narsimhapur. There is 
clearly a lack of accountability between local leaders of the disadvantaged groups and the 
constituency. This allows political manoeuvring for personal gains and makes possible the 
politics of co-option.  The common response of the traditional leadership in this district to the 
emergence of Panchayat institutions is that of co-option. This co-option is either by becoming 
the members of the institution themselves or by putting their protégée as their representatives. 
It is not surprising that the traditional power groups have acted to protect their influence; and 
that this has been done by providing strategic support to individuals before elections and thus 
co-option of their allegiance. What is interesting is the view at the grassroots that it is the 
ability to deliver that is important. The fact that democratic power is being appropriated is less 
important. This reflects the low level of awareness of rights and lack of empowerment.  
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 These findings show the critical need to raise awareness among the poor and disadvantaged to 
demand greater accountability from their politicians. In Balangir, Orissa, NGOs are actively 
involved in awareness building so that these communitie s can claim their rights and 
responsibilities. However, this is being done through parallel institutions (NGOs and CBOs) 
rather than through existing PRIs.  While the civil society has an important role to play, to be 
sustainable in the long-run, these parallel institutions would have to link to the formal 
institutions. How this will be achieved is less clear.  
 
Impact on PRI functioning and development activities 
 
5. In Narsimhapur the influence of the traditional power groups is pervasive. They control 
decision making in the Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha; choose projects that are to be 
undertaken from the funds received; manipulate the formulation of the list of Households 
Below Poverty Line; and manage the wider village-level opinions on matters relating to PRIs 
  
 In Betul, traditional leaders outside the PRIs appear to have little influence on the functioning 
of the Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha. 
 
6. The above findings raise questions about the nature of development that may be taking place.   
Albeit, some improvements are taking place at the village level, but the overall path of 
development remains/is being skewed to serve the vested interests of the traditionally 
dominant groups. 
 
 This could partially explain why most donors are setting up parallel village committees to 
implement their projects. Other reason could be that it is easier to maintain control and 
monitor a project when it is not linked to other institutions. The downside of this approach is 
that it further weakens the position of the truly elected member (in Betul) and allows a co-
opted system to operate without any interference (in Narsimhapur).  
 
7. If donor projects are implemented through the PRIs then these institutions may be forced to 
be more accountable and their procedures made more transparent as part of the project 
requirement.  
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6.  Revenue Generation Potential of PRIs 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Much of the power of Local Government stems from its revenue generation potential and its ability to 
spend. It is also indicative of the level of fiscal devolution that has actually taken place and of the 
ability of local representatives to use this power. However, the assessment of the revenue generation 
potential of the PRIs was severely constrained by lack of budgetary information provided by the 
institutions. The study had aimed to collect three years budgetary figures (1998-99, 1999-00, and 
2000-01). Firstly, no financial records were made available for Betul district. Secondly, for 
Narsimhapur the audited statements of all the three years were not available. As a result, this analysis 
is based on the latest year for which complete information was available. The analysis in this chapter 
is therefore based on the records made available in Narsimhapur district. 
 
This chapter examines the potential for, and the actual revenue generation, at the three levels of the 
Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha (section 6.2), the Janpad (Section 6.3) and the Zila Panchayat 
(Section 6.4). 
6.2 Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha 
Under the state Act the revenue generating potential of the PRIs is through: 
¨ Taxation; and 
¨ Rent from lease of land, natural resources etc. 
 
Other sources of fund are linked to the various central and state sponsored schemes and budget lines. 
These are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
6.2.1 Taxation 
The amendment pertaining to the introduction of the system of Gram Swaraj in January 2001 
transferred the power to levy tax in certain cases from the GP to the Gram Sabha. However, the Gram 
Panchayat is expected to monitor the financial activities of the Gram Sabha. As it has been only one 
year since the transfer of these powers the study combined the issue of taxation of Gram Sabha and 
the Gram Panchayat together and collected the perception of the members of Gram Sabha and the 
Panchayat representatives together.  
 
Under the state act of Panchayat Raj the Gram Sabha and the GP have the powers to levy and collect 
compulsory and optional taxes (Table 6.1). A local government is required to levy the compulsory 
taxes, while optional taxes are left to the discretion of the local government.  
 
Table 6.1 Compulsory and Optional Taxes That Can be Levied by the Gram Sabha and the     
Gram Panchayat in Madhya Pradesh  
Institution Compulsory Taxes Optional Taxes 
Gram 
Sabha 
1. Property Tax. Gram Sabha will 
levy tax on land and buildings other 
1. Tax on building not covered in 
compulsory Property Tax 
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Institution Compulsory Taxes Optional Taxes 
than those belonging to central/state 
government or to ZP/JP with value 
more than Rs 6000. 
2. Professional Tax on persons 
carrying out trade or profession in 
Gram Sabha area. 
3. Street Lighting tax if the Gram 
Sabha makes such arrangements 
4. Tax on Private Latrines if the 
Gram Sabha makes any arrangement 
for cleaning of toilets in private houses 
 
2. Tax on animals used for riding, driving, 
draught or burden. 
3. Tax on dogs and pigs. 
4. Fees for the use of sarai, dharamshala, rest 
house, slaughter house and encamping ground 
5. Water rate where such an arrangement has 
been made by the Gram Sabha 
6. Tax on person carrying out the 
profession of purchaser, agent, commission 
agent, weighing man, measurer in the area 
of Gram Sabha 
7. Temporary tax for special works of public 
utility 
8. Tax for the construction/maintenance of 
public latrines 
9. General scavenging tax for disposal/ 
removal of refuse 
10 Fees for bullock cart and tonga stand 
11. Fees for temporary structure/projection 
over any public place/temporary occupation 
12. Fees for cattle grazing  
13. Any other tax that the State legislature has 
the power to impose 
Gram 
Panchayat  
1. Market fees on persons exposing 
goods for sale in any market or at any 
place or any building belonging to or 
under the control of GP. 
2. Fees on registration of cattle sold 
in any market or in any place 
belonging to or under the control of 
GP. 
1. Tax on bullock carts, cycle rickshaws, 
bicycles used for hire within the limits of GP. 
2. Water rate where arrangements are made 
by GP for regular supply of water. 
3. Fees for drainage where system for 
drainage has been introduced by the GP. 
4. Fees by owners of vehicles other than 
motor vehicle, where such vehicle motor 
vehicle enter the GP area. 
Source: MPGSPR Act (1993) 
 
Eight Gram Sabha and GPs were visited by the study team. None levied any tax. According to the 
representatives of the Gram Sabha and the GP the main reasons for not imposing any tax are as 
follows: 
 
(i) Tax only if there is a service : Gram Sabha can only levy tax if it is providing any service. 
Since none of the Gram Sabhas are providing any of the services, for example, streetlight or 
cleaning of private latrines, the Gram Sabha cannot charge tax on such services. The villagers 
were categorical in stating that given the state of power supply at the moment it is difficult to 
collect taxes, as there will be no lighting even if arrangements are made for the streetlight.  
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(ii) Resource support to Gram Sabha to provide the service : The funds that are received by 
the Gram Sabha are tied in nature. These funds do not enable the Gram Sabha to provide 
taxable services. For example, the Gram Sabha can levy tax on cleaning of private or public 
toilets, but it can only do if it is able to provide funds and/or material to enable the households 
to construct these toilets. At the moment such funds are available under the water and 
sanitation project called WATSAN- an UNICEF-DFID-Cida programme. However, the 
implementation of this project is not within the control or management of the Gram Sabha.  
Thus, the potential for levying tax is limited by the lack of resource support to Gram Sabha in 
the provision of services. 
 
(iii) Collection mechanism: The Panchayat representatives were of the view that even if they did 
levy the tax, they do not have any mechanism, as is available to the state government, where 
by they can enforce collection of tax in the village.  
 
(iv) Resistance from the community: The community resists tax on property and profession on 
grounds that the Gram Sabha has not made any contribution in the construction of their 
houses or in facilitating their trade. According to the community, the houses have been in the 
village for decades and people have been carrying on their trade even without the Gram Sabha 
or the GP. Therefore, there is no reason as to why the Gram Sabha should levy tax on the 
residents or on certain professions. 
 
(v) Tax is not seen as a potential for revenue generation: The research team raised the issue of 
financial self-reliance and collection of tax with the Gram Sabha. Rather surprisingly the 
members of the Gram Sabha were of the view that these two issues are not related. They 
argued that if taxes are levied they are in lieu of certain services and these services are to be 
paid for. Hence, there is no likelihood that the Gram Sabha will be able to generate savings 
through taxation. This of course raises questions of gram sabha’s perceptions of efficient 
management and of its ability to cost and price products/services.  
 
It was also noted that if the Gram Sabha wants to undertake a community-based activity (like 
construction of a temple) then it could raise money through individual donations as it has 
been doing in the past. However, such a strategy for raising funds is not considered for 
infrastructure and/or service development related to enhancing economic activities. 
 
As Table 6.2 shows Batesra Panchayat is the only exception that has generated some funds of its own. 
These funds are from leasing of a small pond that is within the GP limits and on the interest earned 
through its deposit in the bank. The Gram Sabha/GP has been empowered to lease land and other 
resources on rent. These are ponds/lakes below 10 hectares for the purposes of fishing; and mining of  
minor minerals that fall within the Gram Sabha area. The other GPs were not able to generate their 
own source of funds during the past three years. 
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       Table 6.2 Funds Available to the Gram Panchayat by Source and by Block 
Jhoteshwar Manegaon Thalwada Batesra 
Receipts  
 
1988-99 
(%) 
2000-01 
(%) 
2000-01 
(%) 
2000-01 
(%) 
Own Sources 
Nil Nil 
 
Nil 
 
2594 
(1) 
Centrally sponsored schemes 
273877 
(55) 
120901 
(57) 
338368 
(69) 
86685 
(37) 
State sponsored schemes 
16551 
(3) 
53079 
(25) 
Nil 
 
Nil 
 
Recommendation of SFC 
28097 
(6) 
Nil 
 
99836 
(20) 
72530 
(31) 
Establishment 
3400 
(1) 
1350 
(1) 
15930 
(4) 
18074 
(8) 
Other Sources 
175102 
(35) 
36154 
(17) 
33717 
(7) 
51820 
(22) 
Grand Total 
497027 
(100) 
211844 
(100) 
487851 
(100) 
231766 
(100) 
 Source: Collected by the Study Team from Records made Available at the GP. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the actual monies raised by the local governments and funds received by the Gram 
Panchayat under development schemes. The funds received under the centrally or State sponsored 
schemes are tied in terms of their usage and utilisation. The funds received on recommendation of 
SFC are also tied, though there is some flexibility. The GP/Gram Sabha can prioritise the items on 
which these funds will be spent.  
 
The evidence presented above would seem to indicate that 
(i) Local governments at this level generate only negligible funds and thus rely heavily on 
national government; 
(ii) there has been only limited fiscal devolution because much of the development funds coming 
down to the village level is tied in nature and is inflexible;  
(iii) compounding the problem is the limited ability of representatives to use the powers devolved. 
The understanding of fiscal issues by the representatives at this level of seems weak and 
inadequate and clearly need strengthening; and 
(iv) the circle of tax/service needs to be broken. 
6.3 Janpad Panchayat (Block Level)  
Table 6.3 shows compulsory and optional taxes for the JP in the state as stipulated in the The 
MPGSPR Act 1993. 
 
Table 6.3 Taxes that can be Levied by the Janpad Panchayat 
Compulsory taxes Optional taxes 
Tax on theatre or theatrical performance and 
other performance of public entertainment 
Fees for any licence or permission granted for use 
and occupation of lands or other properties vested 
in or maintained by JP 
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Source: MPGSPR Act. Government of MP (1993). 
 
Though the JPs have a certain proportion of funds as Own Sources (Table 6.4), they have not 
generated this through collection of tax revenue. The collection is primarily through income from 
lease rentals of the jetty or mining of minor minerals. The sources of funds of the four JPs visited by 
the team are shown below. 
 
Table 6.4 Funds Available to Janpad Panchayat by Source, and by Block. 
 Blocks  
Chichli Gotegaon Major Heads  
 
 
1998-99 
(%) 
1999-2000 
(%) 
2000-2001 
(%) 
1999-00 
(%) 
Own Sources 
 
353926 
(2) 
312071 
(2) 
2350356 
(17) 
390034 
(3) 
Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes 
 
15969715 
(80) 
7076766 
(51) 
10707410 
(77) 
4632176 
(32) 
State Sponsored Schemes 
 
3483476 
(17) 
6089901 
(44) 
584901 
(4) 
9296395 
(64) 
Establishment 
 
219000 
(1) 
223333 
(2) 
223021 
(2) 
252750 
(2) 
Other Sources 
 
3000 
(-) 
53500 
(-) 
26290 
(-) 
47971 
(-) 
Grand Total 
 
20029117 
(100) 
13755570 
(100) 
13891977 
(100) 
14619326 
(100) 
       Source: Collected by the Study Team from Records made Available at the JP. 
 
Rental income explains the funds generated under “Own Sources”. In Chichli block income is from 
lease of jetty used for fishing and for boating. In Gotegaon, the Janpad Panchayat has raised money by 
leasing out mining right of minor minerals; from fees collected for giving permit for audio/video hall, 
and from interest earned for the deposit in bank.  
 
Additionally, the state government allocates a portion of stamp duty to JP as untied fund which is 
generally included in the category of Own Sources. Despite a number of heads, from which the JP is 
able to receive funds, in Gotegaon the Own Source constitutes only 2 per cent of the total funds of the 
JP. In case of Chichli, the proportion of own funds have increased to 17 per cent of the funds received 
by JP. This increase is due to ten-fold increase in the funds received from the state government under 
Stamp Duty. 
 
Discussions with Janpad representatives revealed that Own Source funds are not being used for any 
development projects. In fact there were no plans of how this money could be spent. The explanation 
offered for this under-utilisation is that it is ‘building up funds’. These findings underscore the need 
for capacity building at this and lower levels for strategic planning and for greater grasp of fiscal 
issues. 
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6.4 Zila Panchayat  
In January 2001 much of the powers to levy tax have been devolved to the village level. The Own 
Source of funds now includes income from interest, revenue provided by Stamp Duty and rent from 
property. Among these the levy and collection of Stamp Duty is the responsibility of the state 
government. The other two sources are controlled and managed by the ZP itself. 
 
  Table 6.5 Funds Available to the Zila Panchayat. 
Narsimhapur District Major Heads  
 
 
1998-99 
(%) 
1999-2000 
(%) 
Own Sources 
186,750
(0.08)
1,615,192
(0.71)
Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes 178,753,027 207,980,202
State Sponsored Schemes 60,266,050 15,412,455
Establishment 2,059,490 2,812,690
Other Sources 671,819 831,786
Grand Total 241,939,035 228,652,324
     Source: Collected by the Study Team from Records made Available  
       by the ZP. 
As is in the case of GP and JP, the ZP has also not levied any tax that was within its powers. It has 
generated its own revenue through non-tax sources. However, no information was made available on 
how the funds would be used.  
6.5.  Summary of findings 
 
Revenue generation potential of the PRIs: 
¨ Considerable fiscal power had been devolved to the PRIs, particularly to the Gram Panchayat and 
Gram Sabha. These relate to tax on property, pursuit of particular professions; civic amenities; on 
trading. The study found that PRIs have failed to exercise powers and responsibilities. This is true 
even in case of compulsory taxation. The only source of income of the local bodies is entirely 
through non-tax sources.  
 
Taxation 
¨ The issue of revenue generation by PRIs is caught in a circular argument. It is argued that there 
can be no taxation if there is no service provided.  PRIs are as much unwilling to tax, as the 
community is unwilling to pay. The PRI representatives note that they are a part of the 
community that is expected to pay the tax. The community in general is unwilling and hostile to 
the idea of paying taxes. Hence, it does not make good political sense to tax ‘your own people’ 
when neither the availability of the service or its quality can be assured. 
 
 However, it seems that many of the services that the Gram Sabha can support would benefit the 
poor, but may be irrelevant to the better off, i.e., those exerting power within the new system. 
Hence there is little incentive to tax (and court unpopularity) for benefits of little value to the 
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influential. There may be case for consciousness raising and generation of demand for such 
services among the poor to break the circle. 
 
Ability to generate and manage income  
¨ It is clear that the vision for increasing their own sources of income is missing at all levels. PRIs 
still expect the state government to levy and collect taxes. It is argued that this collection can be 
then transferred to the PRIs.  This reflects the culture of dependence that has evolved over the last 
50 years.  
 
¨ The professed reason given by the representatives is that taxation of any kind (land revenue, 
property tax, professional tax) is coercive in nature. Furthermore, that tax by itself does not ensure 
any service; hence the emphasis should be more on generating income through lease rent than 
through taxation. While this is said, there are no plans to use this money to provide services and 
for infrastructure development.  
 
¨ Lease Rent and Revenue: The community was of the opinion that the PRIs can increase their 
income by leasing out common property resources like land and water sources. In such situations 
they asserted that government should do the collection of such revenue, as it is difficult for the 
PRIs or the Gram Sabha to collect revenue. 
 
¨ Donations and Contributions: In all study villages there were examples where the community has 
made donations or contribution for construction of community resources or for work that is to 
benefit the community at large; for example construction of temple. However, such a strategy is 
not considered for improving prospects for income generation or for enhancing livelihood 
opportunities. 
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7.  Village Level Developmental Activities: Limited Focus 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
It is clear from the previous chapter that the principal source of funding for rural development is 
centrally sponsored schemes. The schemes provide the framework for government’s development 
work. These schemes are top-down with budget lines and priorities set at the national and then at the 
district level. Though local institutions have only limited influence on these schemes the leadership in 
PRIs are able to sway the decision making to their own benefit. The GP and the Gram Sabha also 
undertake some projects under these schemes and from their own source. These are also reviewed. 
 
The government schemes are implemented through DRDA and the line departments of the state 
government. As per the Business Allocation Rules of the state government, the work of the state 
government is allocated to 51 departments at the Secretariat level. These rules state the matters of 
policy that are dealt with by each of the departments. Table 7.1 list all departments that in some way 
could be involved in rural programmes. The present study reviewed the schemes for which 
information was available. At this stage of the study no information was available on the impact of 
these schemes or the number of participating households. However, this chapter shows that most 
developmental activities at the village level has very limited focus. 
 
                 Table 7.1 List of state Departments that could be Involved in Rural Programmes. 
  
Departments that affect 
Livelihood activities 
1.   Panchayat and Rural Development 
2.   Forests 
3.   Revenue 
4.   Agriculture 
5.   Water Resources 
6.   Women and Child 
7.   Rural Industry 
8.   Industry 
9.   Mining 
10. Animal Husbandry 
11. Fisheries 
12. Food and Civil Supplies 
13. Labour 
14. Environment 
Departments with primary 
task of Coordination among 
departments  
15. SC and ST Welfare 
16. OBC Welfare 
Departments focussed on 
provision of Basic Services 
17. Education 
18. Health 
19. Public Health Engineering 
Departments that have 
Other activities 
20. Cooperatives 
21. Energy 
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7.2 Schemes and Activities of Selected Departments  
This section describes the schemes being implemented in the study area by different departments. The 
schemes are viewed in terms of its objectives, eligibility criteria of the beneficiary and the 
implementation and fund flow mechanism. 
 
7.2.1 Department of Panchayat and Rural Development 
All the schemes implemented by the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development in the two 
districts are Centrally Sponsored Schemes. The money for these schemes is in the ratio of 75:25 for 
Centre and the State. The central share is directly sent to the DRDA where the state also contributes 
its share to the specific account of the scheme. There are essentially three types of schemes that are 
being implemented in Narsimhapur and Betul. These schemes are: 
 
1. Schemes promoting Self employment 
(a) SJGSY 
SJGSY is implemented by the Rural Development department through the DRDA in the district. The 
scheme operates by way of formation of self-help groups in the village that act as thrift and credit 
group for the beneficiary. The activity is selected by the individual and approved by the group. To be 
eligible for the loan assistance the beneficiary has to be listed in the list of families below poverty 
line. The aim of this scheme is to provide additional income for budgetary needs rather than for 
productive use.  
 
The JP identifies certain activities for the block that will be promoted for alleviating poverty in the 
block. Table 7.2 shows the activities identified in the four blocks by the JP that will be supported 
under SJGSY. Discussions with DRDA showed that the choice of activities to be supported is not 
related to the needs of the village/block. There is no assessment of needs or of potential before 
activities are recommended. It appears that the support is provided for traditional activities and little 
effort is made to identify potential areas. Furthermore, the emphasis is only on income generation on a 
small scale with no stress on marketing of products.   
 
Table 7.2  Core activity to be funded under SJGSY in Narsimhapur and Betul 
Narsimhapur Betul 
Gotegaon Chichli Bhimpur Betul 
§ Dairy 
§ Poultry 
§ Minor 
Irrigation 
§ Brick making 
§ Making of Brass Utensils 
§ Brick Making 
§ Minor Irrigation 
§ Dairy 
§ Poultry 
§ Beetle leaf cultivation 
§ Dairy 
§ Poultry 
§ Brick making 
§ Goat keeping 
§ White musli 
§ Bamboo baskets 
§ Dairy 
§ Poultry 
§ Brick making 
§ Goat keeping 
§ Jaggery making 
 
 
(b) Family based unit 
Khadi and Village Industries Board implements the scheme for encouraging families to establish 
family based units in rural areas. The scheme provides grant assistance up to 90 percent of the capital 
(maximum of Rs13,500). In an associated scheme the Board also provides training to the families that 
have been sanctioned assistance under the family based unit scheme. 
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2 Schemes promoting Wage-Employment: JGSY and EGS aim to provide income by  
undertaking labour intensive projects improving village infrastructure. JGSY is planned and 
implemented by the Gram Sabha, where as the EGS is planned and implemented by the Zila and 
Janpad Panchayat. Under EGS, the total money in the district is divided in the ratio of 30:70 between 
Zila and Janpad Panchayats. Each of these agencies has the flexibility to choose their own 
implementing agency (which can be the GP and generally is). In the implementation of both the 
schemes the provision for minimum wages and equal wages for men and women is ensured. 
 
JGSY is being implemented in all the villages in all districts. EGS is implemented according to the 
plan prepared by the Janpad and the Zila Panchayat. The EGS aims at providing some guaranteed 
days of wage labour to at least one member of the each family living below the poverty line. Though 
this programme seems reasonable  on paper, Panchayats find it very difficult to generate such 
employment opportunities at the village level that can employ the large number of poor living in the 
village. 
 
It must be noted here that considerable influence is exerted by the Panchayat leaders in the choice of 
projects, their location in the village and in the choice of the local contractor to implement the project. 
As noted in Chapter 3, Panchayat meeting are not always convened because of lack of quorum and 
decisions are often taken by the Sarpanch and the Secretary. 
 
3. Improvement in housing : The two schemes that aim towards improvement of housing in 
rural areas are IAY and the Rural Credit-cum-Subsidy housing scheme. The former is targeted to 
households below poverty line, where as, the latter to the families above poverty line (but annual 
income less than Rs 32,000) who are otherwise ineligible to get assistance under IAY. 
 
The Gram Sabha selects beneficiary for IAY and JP selects the beneficiary under credit-cum-subsidy 
scheme. The money under the scheme is sent by the DRDA to the GP in case of both the schemes. 
The GP then re-distributes the money to the selected beneficiary. 
 
7.2.2Department of Agriculture  and other Departments  
Department of Agriculture implements both the centrally sponsored and state sponsored schemes in 
the two districts. The department implements the following types of schemes: 
 
Increase in production and productivity: Major proportions of the schemes implemented by the 
Department of Agriculture are directed to increase the production and productivity of selected crops. 
The beneficiaries for these schemes are selected by the Rural Agriculture Extension Officer (RAEO) 
and approved by the standing committee on Agriculture of the GP. Once the beneficiary deposits his 
portion of the contribution the benefits from the scheme are provided to him directly by the supplier. 
 
(a)   Agricultural crops 
The schemes that are implemented in Betul and Narsimhapur include Integrated Cereal Development 
Programme (Coarse Cereals); National Pulses Development Programme;  
Oilseed Production Programme; Sustainable Development of Sugarcane (only in Narsimhapur) and 
Intensive Cotton Development Programme. Annapurna and Surajdhara programmes also form part of 
this category of programmes where seeds for oilseed and pulse crops are provided free of cost to small 
and marginal farmers belonging to SC and ST communities. 
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These schemes provide a basket of services in terms of seed minikit, field demonstrations, fertilisers, 
insecticides and pesticides, improved agriculture equipment and training for the farmers. The above 
schemes focus on the small and marginal farmers with additional subsidy to the SC and ST farmers in 
these categories.  
 
Programme to Promote Farm Mechanisation: Subsidy is provided to farmers willing to buy tractor. 
The beneficiary for the scheme is selected by a committee that is constituted under the Chairmanship 
of the District Collector.  
 
Irrigation: The schemes for increasing the area under irrigation include construction of wells and 
installation of tube wells on the field of individual farmers, as well as promotion of community or 
group based irrigation. These schemes provide subsidy to the farmers that have an in-built bias in 
favour of the SC, ST farmers and farmers whose land holding belongs to small and marginal category. 
The beneficiary under the scheme are identified and selected by the RAEO. 
 
Others : Promotion of pits to make organic fertiliser and National Bio-gas Development programme 
are implemented by the agriculture department. The latter programme aims to provide alternative 
source of power as well as enriched organic manure to the farmers. The former is aimed to improve 
the on-farm productivity by enabling the farmer to produce organic manure on his own farm-land. 
 
(b) Horticulture crops  
The responsibility for promotion of production and productivity of vegetables, fruits, flowers and 
spices is that of Department of Horticulture in the district. The department provides assistance by way 
of improved seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, regular training and field demonstration to the farmer.  
 
The main crop promoted in the two districts by the department is given in Table 7.3 
  Table 7.3  Main Horticulture Crops Promoted in the  Selected districts  
Crop Betul Narsimhapur 
Fruits - Mangoes 
- Oranges 
- Lemon 
- Papaya  
Spices - Coriander  
- Ginger 
- Turmeric  
- Chillies  
- Garlic 
- 
Flowers  - Rose 
- Aster 
- Marigold 
- Gladioli 
- Rajnigandha 
- Guldaudi 
- Rose 
- Aster 
- Marigold 
- Gladioli 
- Rajnigandha 
- Guldaudi 
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(c) Fisheries 
The Department of Fisheries implements schemes related to promotion of fisheries in the districts. 
The main components of the scheme include assistance for purchase of inputs (seeds, medicines, 
fishing net, aerator etc), improvement of lakes and ponds and training of fish farmers. The schemes 
are generally targeted towards community of fishermen to motivate them to function under the 
organisational framework of cooperatives.  
 
(d) Animal husbandry 
The Department of Animal Husbandry implements schemes that aim towards improving the 
production and yield of pigs, goats, poultry, sheep, cows, buffaloes and ducks by providing veterinary 
services and through breed improvement and better nutrition of these animals. Most the programmes 
are targeted towards families that own the animals or towards small and marginal farmers to augment 
their income through supplementary economic activity. There is special component of subsidy for 
beneficiaries belonging to scheduled castes and tribes. 
 
(e) Sericulture  
The Department of Sericulture promotes both the production of tussar-silk and mulberry-silk in the 
districts. The emphasis of the scheme is to provide inputs to mulberry silk producers by way of 
training and provision of equipment and tools for cocoon production. In certain cases the farmers are 
also encouraged to undertake mulberry plantation on their land. For both the production of mulberry 
and cocoon the department ensures buy-back guarantee of the produce from the producers. 
 
(f) Forest Produce 
The Forest Department in the two districts operates at two levels: one, within the forest area and in 
areas that are outside the defined forest areas. In both the districts the two major schemes for 
regeneration of trees and collection of their produce outside the forest area is promoted through Social 
Forestry or Lok Vaniki schemes. Within the forest areas the community is empowered to gather the 
non-nationalised forest produce. 
 
(f) Wage-employment Programmes 
Rain-fed Watershed Development Programme is implemented by the department to provide wage 
employment and to generate employment of additional persondays for the small and marginal 
farmers. The additional benefit under the programme is to increase the water retention capacity of the 
soil and to arrest the process of land degradation and deterioration. 
 
Thus, the schemes and programmes have the following characteristics: 
§ the schemes are targeted to households that already possess the economic base (land, animal, 
lake); 
§ the schemes attempt to increase the production by providing quality inputs and training to the 
producer; 
§ distribution of tools and equipment also form part of the assistance under the schemes; 
§ the schemes are individual oriented and operate within the district. The guidelines of the schemes 
do not specify dovetailing with schemes of other departments; 
§ only the schemes of sericulture department is implemented to promote alternative/ supplementary 
source of income for the beneficiaries; 
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§ the only non-farm activity being directly promoted is silk production. It will be useful to know the 
potential for scaling up of this activity;  
§ the perspective of these schemes is small scale only hoping to achieve small increases in income 
to carry the households above poverty line. 
§  
7.3 Activities of the Gram Panchayats 
The study collected information on the activity focus of each of the Gram Panchayats visited during 
the field study. This information is based on the expenditure incurred by the Gram Panchayats during 
the last three years (1998-2002). The data collected is presented in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.4   Activity Focus of Gram Panchayat in Narsimhapur District 
Chichli Block Gotegaon Block  
Batesra Thalwada Joteshwar Manegaon 
Welfare   Social Security 
Pension 
 Social Security 
Pension 
 Old Age 
Pension 
 Maternity 
benefit 
 Balika 
Samridhi 
 Social Security 
Pension 
 Old Age 
Pension 
 Social Security 
Pension 
 Old Age 
Pension 
 Destitute 
Pension 
 Maternity 
benefit 
 Balika 
Samridhi 
Housing   IAY  IAY  IAY  IAY 
Infrastructure   Stone Tiles on 
Village Road 
 Platform 
(chaupal) 
 Road 
Construction 
 Shed 
Construction 
 School Building 
 Urinal in school 
 Soak pit  
 Stone Tiles on 
Village Road 
 Platform 
(chaupal) 
 Road  
 School 
Building 
 Stone Tiles on 
Village Road 
 Road  
 Culvert   
 School 
Building 
 Water Tank  
 School 
Building  
 Well for 
Irrigation 
 Stone Tiles on 
Village Road 
 Road  
 School 
Building 
 Panchayat 
Building  
Natural 
Resources 
Management 
 Plantation  Plantation -None- -None- 
Repairs and 
Maintenance  
 School Building 
Repair 
 School 
Building Repair 
 School 
Building 
Repair 
 School 
Building 
Repair 
 
In Narsimhapur the Gram Panchayat has contributed to RNFE in terms of: 
§ providing wage employment through various construction activities 
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§ creating village level infrastructure that has the potential to facilitate trade by improving the 
accessibility (construction of roads and culverts) 
§ undertaking plantation in the village that could increase the supply of raw material on which 
RNFE activity can be carried out 
Table 7.5   Activity Focus of Gram Panchayat in Betul District 
Bhimpur Block Betul Block  
Hirdi Palaspani Devgaon Jaitpur 
Welfare   Social Security 
Pension 
 Old Age 
Pension 
 Social Security 
Pension 
 
 Social Security 
Pension 
 
 Social Security 
Pension 
 
Housing   IAY  IAY  IAY  IAY 
Infrastructure   Stone Tiles on 
Village Road 
 Road 
Construction 
 School Building 
 Anganwadi 
building 
 Stone Tiles on 
Village Road 
 Road  
 School 
Building 
 Soak pit 
 Stone Tiles on 
Village Road 
 Road  
 School 
Building 
 Soak Pit 
 
 Road  
 School 
Building 
 
Natural 
Resources 
Management 
 Forest 
Protection 
 Plantation 
 Percolation 
tank 
 Check Dam 
 Plantation 
 Percolation 
tank 
-None- 
Repairs and 
Maintenance  
 School Building 
Repair 
 School 
Building Repair 
 School 
Building 
Repair 
 School 
Building  
 Road 
 
The Gram Panchayats at Betul have contributed to promotion of RNFE activity through: 
§ providing wage employment through different construction activities like road, school building, 
paving of village roads etc 
§ connectivity of the village is improved by creation of corresponding village infrastructure in terms 
of construction of roads in all the four villages 
§ plantation has the potential for increasing the availability of raw material through which RNFE 
can be generated 
  
The Gram Panchayats in Betul and Narsimhapur have focussed on spending money that was received 
under different schemes of the central and state government. It needs to be pointed out that the funds 
received under these schemes are tied in nature and GP does not have the flexibility in changing the 
use to which the money can be put to. 
 
The activities that have been listed above as having the potential for facilitating RNFE have not been 
carried out for the sole or main purpose of promoting RNFE in the village. The main intention of 
these activities has been to improve the village level infrastructure. If in the process they are able to 
support the RNFE then it is incidental and not part of the design. Nevertheless, the capacity and 
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potential of the GPs is established as they have made their ability to deliver products (like 
infrastructure items) to the community. 
 
Banks 
There were Nationalised Banks, Regional Rural Banks, Land Development Banks and Cooperative 
Banks functioning in both the districts. Each of these banks was spread out in the district through their 
braches. In Narsimhapur, these banks were operating through their 81 branches in the district, with 
one branch over a population of 9697. Within the district, Chichli has the least concentration of 
branches (one branch over a population of 13097 persons). 
 
Banks as financial institutions play a critical role in identification of key activities that will be 
provided credit in the area, the financial support mechanism, and in finalising the beneficiary 
proposed by the department and Panchayat institution. The departments only have the 
recommendatory powers. This is so because banks assess the proposal on the financial viability and 
credit worthiness of the beneficiary. According to them if a beneficiary is a defaulter in any bank 
under any programme, then such a person is not entitled to loan from the bank.  
 
The role of banks and nature of lending is being investigated by the on-going household survey in 
these two districts. 
 
7.4 Summary of Findings 
 
¨ Expectedly the focus of the developmental schemes is on improving natural resource based 
activities. The limitations lie in the narrow sub-sectoral approach. Issues of production for the 
larger local market or marketing of produce are not addressed. 
 
¨ Developmental initiatives are limited in their perspective as they envisage only small increases 
in income to improve household’s budgetary income. The underlying aim of these projects is to 
take the poor households above the Poverty Line. 
 
¨ At the village level the approach of all government developmental effort is small scale, with no 
effort to identify emergent sectors or to explore potential of scaling up. 
 
¨ A large number of line departments are involved at the village level, but there is no co-
ordination of effort or dovetailing of projects. This would be essential to build up a critical mass 
for wider change. There is no effort to develop synergies between schemes. 
 
¨ Restricted by the tied nature of funds, GP and Gram Sabha focus on small-scale infrastructure 
projects. They have demonstrated the capability to execute these projects. In addition to 
improving the roads in the village, co-ordination between different village Panchayats could 
lead to the improvement of connecting roads. This could have direct impact on marketing and 
other trading opportunities for the village. 
 
¨ Electricity is a still a major problem in these districts. The Gram Panchayats could be more 
active in improving the situation. However, it has to be admitted that shortage of power is one 
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the biggest problem the state government is grappling with following the creation of 
Chatttisgarh state, which has inherited most productive capacity. 
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8. Other Institutions of Local Governance 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
In additions to PRI there are other institutions of local governance in the villages. The study reviewed 
the working of these institutions in terms of their composition, functioning, and inter-institutional 
linkages to see if they impacted on non-farm activitie s in any way. 
 
Other than the PRIs, the institutions of local governance that were identified are: 
¨ Traditional institutions  
¨ Project or scheme based institutions  
¨ Cooperatives  
¨ Civil society organisations  
8.2 Traditional Institutions   
Traditional institutions were based on caste and tribal groups. The institutions identified during the 
field work are shown in Table 8.1. All these are based on caste/ tribal lines. 
                        Table 8.1 Traditional Institutions, by Village 
Narsimhapur Betul Institutions  
Parasw
ada 
Jhoteshw
er 
B
atesara 
D
ahalw
ada 
K
hatapani 
H
irdli 
R
atanpur 
C
how
ki 
Gond Samaj v v v v v v v v 
Korku Samaj - - - - v v - - 
Kalar Samaj v - - - - v - -- 
Kunbi Samaj - - - - - - v - 
Patel Samaj v - v - - - - - 
Brahamin Samaj - - v - - - - - 
Rajput Samaj - - v v -- - - - 
Yadav Samaj v - - - - - - - 
Sahu Samaj v - - - - - - - 
Sarma Samaj - - v - - - - - 
          Source: Field Survey. 
 
8.2.1 Composition and Membership 
The membership of the traditional institutions is based on the caste/tribe to which a person is born. 
These institutions are known as Samaj (literal meaning is society) and are spread over an area of 25-
30 villages. Each of the samaj is headed by a mukhiya (leader) at village and regional levels. The 
actual territorial spread of the samaj is based on the number of families belonging to that caste/tribal 
group in that particular area. Thus, a Gond in the village will be a member of the Gond samaj of the 
village as well as the regional organisation that exist over a defined area.  
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The membership to the samaj is open to all the members of that particular caste or tribe for both men 
and women.  
 
8.2.2 Meetings and Functions  
There is no pre-defined mechanism for meeting of these institutions, though all the societies reported 
that they meet at least once every year. Most of the meeting of the samaj are need based, that is, as 
and when the members feel the need for the meeting the group conducts such meetings. The main 
function of the samaj is to: 
¨ Review the social and religious practices of the samaj; 
¨ lay down the rules and norms for social matters (e.g. marriages); 
¨ make decisions concerning dispute resolutions related (domestic - divorce, economic- land 
ownership, inter-samaj- between Yadav and Rajputs); and 
¨ any specific matter that is brought to the notice of the members (e.g. migration among Gonds). 
 
 
The roles of these societies appear to be essentially social. The members of the samaj reported that in 
case of conflicts or disputes their first attempt is to bring the dispute to the samaj. This was even in 
case of minor incidents of violence among the members and issues concerning land disputes. It is 
when the matter is not resolved at the samaj, that the concerned government official is contacted. In 
certain cases the dispute is also taken at the regional organisation of the samaj. 
 
People in all villages noted that earlier the samaj also discussed and undertook decisions related to 
economic matters (which crop to cultivate, what should be the rate of exchange-barter, what should be 
the manner of resource utilisation and so on). However, over a period of time such matters have 
slipped of the agenda. Increasingly government schemes and field extension workers have had greater 
say in these matters. This has undermined the economic role of these societies. Furthermore, as 
different households sign up to different schemes, household behaviour becomes more individualist. 
The members across caste and tribal groups reported that of late the samaj has started intervening in 
political matters, especially electoral politics (choice of candidate, party to which the members should 
vote for etc). However, as the next section shows, they have had little influence.  
 
8.2.3 Linkages with other Institutions  
(a) PRIs  
The caste dynamics, in terms of aligning themselves with other caste groups, and in selecting a 
candidate for the seat of Panchayat was found to be prominent in Narsimhapur. Among the upper 
caste group the issue of retaining their dominance in the village was a critical issue on which caste 
alignments and support to candidates are decided.  
 
In Betul since Gonds are in a majority, the issue is not so much concerning political alliances with 
different tribal groups, as it is related to choice of candidates. In none of four villages has the samaj 
been able to exert its influence in selecting a unanimous candidate for the PRIs. This is because 
political alignments now seem to cut across traditional group lines. This trend is reinforced by the fact 
that leaders of traditional societies, those of who have not acquired wider political support, generally 
have little power or influence outside their tribe/caste group. This also means that they have limited 
influence on the members of the samaj. 
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Regarding links between the traditional institutions and the PRIs, all communities were of the view 
that as far as decisions related to choice of beneficiary for a particular scheme or for accessing 
particular benefits from the scheme is concerned the Gram Sabha and the Gram Panchayat works with 
its own criteria. (It may be useful to recall that the list of beneficiaries has already been influenced by 
the local leaders).  There may be favours shown to a particular family, but by and large the caste/tribal 
factor does not play an important role. Neither do the senior members of the samaj assert their 
influence in decision-making processes.  
 
The different communities interviewed all made a clear distinction between the role played by the 
samaj (social and religious) and the PRIs (accessing government). This distinction is more obvious in 
tribal areas where the community distinguishes between “hamari (our) Panchayat’ and ‘sarkari  
(government) Panchayat’. This distinction indicates that people still do not identify with the local 
government institutions created by the state government. This perception of local government 
institutions, coupled with latter’s limited capacities for planning and implementing projects discussed 
earlier, raises doubts about using the PRIs has a vehicle of project implementation. 
 
(b) Other Institutions  
In relationship with other institution the samaj becomes active only if the other institution is affecting 
the power balance in the community. This is more evident in case of heterogeneous caste villages. 
That is, the moment the existing caste dynamics is sought to be affected by an institution, say a 
project based committee, the members of the samaj, especially the upper caste, will respond by 
becoming the member themselves or by putting their own candidate in the institution (if their own 
membership is excluded). In either case, the dominance is ensured and the power equations remain 
unchanged. These strategies are no different from those used to dominate the PRIs. 
8.3 Project/Scheme Based Institutions  
The project-based institutions include committees or groups formed under different government 
schemes, projects and donor aided projects. These are listed in Table 8.2. It is apparent that a large 
number of schemes and projects are operating in the villages covered by this study. All these project 
related committees are in addition to the eight committees of the Gram Sabha.  The multiplicity of 
such institutions at the micro level raise questions about the level to which the people can really 
participate and benefit from so many different committees. It also means that there is considerable 
pressure on people to participate, often at the expense of other productive activities.  
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      Table 8.2 Shows the Committees Formed Under Different Government Schemes and  
          Donor aided projects, by Village. 
Narsimhapur 
District 
Betul District 
Village Village 
Institutions  
Parasw
ada 
Jhoteshw
e
r Batesara 
D
ahalw
ad
a Khatapani 
H
irdli 
R
atanpur 
C
how
ki  
Forest Protection Committee  - v - v v - v v 
Water and Sanitation Committee  - - - - - v v v 
Parent Teacher Associations  v v v v - v v - 
Village Education Committee v v v v v v v v 
School Management Committee  - - - - v v v v 
SJSY groups  - - -- - v v - - 
Swashakti groups  - - - - v - - - 
Women SHG groups  v v v v v - - - 
 
8.3.1 Composition and Membership 
Each of the project-based committees are formed according to the guidelines of the particular project 
or schemes. The members are selected from the village with the approval of the Gram Sabha. 
However, the team found that with the exception of Water and Sanitation Committee at Hirdi, other 
committees that have been formed are not registered in the minute meeting of the Gram Sabha 
register. Moreover, during discussions with the project officials at the district and state level it was 
revealed that there are no guidelines to the officials to convene the meeting of the Gram Sabha 
according to the procedure laid down in the Panchayat act and record the proceedings in the Gram 
Sabha register.  
 
The membership of the committee ranges between 10–15 persons. There is representation of women 
and lower castes in these committees. In case of some schemes, like SJGSY, the membership is 
limited to families below poverty line.  
 
In some cases, except the President and the Secretary of the committee, the other members were not 
aware that they were members of the group. In case of SJGSY groups there was confusion in the 
village (Khatapani and Hirdi). This was so because a couple of years ago similar groups had been 
formed by the Anganwadi8 worker (under a different scheme) with similar aims. But these groups due 
to lack of support from government have stopped functioning. As the Self Help Groups (SHG) under 
SJGSY are becoming active the older members feel that they should also be the beneficiary of the 
scheme as they had started the group earlier.  
 
8.3.2 Meetings and Functions  
The committees are reported to be meeting regularly, at least once in month. The functions that are 
generally performed by these committees are:  
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¨ Planning and implementation of the activities related to their objectives 
¨ Financial planning 
¨ Exercising control and undertaking maintenance of the activities, resources etc.  
¨ Monitoring and follow up of the activities 
There members were uninformed as to the overall purpose of the project and the role of the committee 
within the project objectives. As a result the members are unclear about their roles and 
responsibilities. They feel that they are accountable to the project facilitators (generally a NGO) and 
to the project. Most of the decisions are taken by the President and the Secretary of the Committee in 
consultation with the project official.  
 
8.3.3 Linkages with Other Institutions  
(a) PRIs  
The GP members were of the opinion that there are no linkages with the Panchayat Raj Institutions. 
The committees are parallel to similar committees under Gram Swaraj and the GPs. For example, the 
Water and Sanitation Committee has the same aim and objective as the Health Committee of the 
Gram Sabha. Also the Forest Protection Committee has similar aims as the Community Resource 
Committee of the Gram Sabha. The GP members felt that these since it is the project committees that 
get the funds they tend to undermine the importance of the functioning of the GP and the standing 
committees of the Gram Sabha. None of the Committees had conducted an audit of their work and 
accounts. 
 
(b) Other Institutions  
The project based committees are not linked to any other institution in the village. According to them 
their mandate is to undertake work related to the project and not interfere or link with other 
institutions in the village. The project officials at the district level expressed similar views on the role 
and functions of the project based committees. 
8.4 Civil Society Institutions 9  
The following civil society institutions were found to exist in the eight villages visited by the team are 
shown in Table 8.3. 
             Table 8.3 Civil Societies in Operating in Study Villages. 
Narsimhapur 
District 
Betul District Institutions  
Village Village 
 Parasw
ada 
Jhoteshw
er 
B
atesara 
D
ahalw
ada 
K
hatapani 
H
irdli 
R
atanpur 
C
how
ki 
Mahila Mandals  (Women’s Assoc.) v v v v v v v v 
Yuva Mandals (Youth Assoc. v v v v v v v v 
RECHA (NGO) - - - - - - v v 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Under the central government scheme all villages in India are visited by a primary health worker-cum midwife 
on a regular basis . She is known as the ‘Anganwadi worker’. 
9 For a critical discussion of the overall role and position of NGOs in MP see DFID-MP (2000). 
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Pradeepan (NGO) - - - - v v - - 
PGVS  (NGO) - - - - v v v v 
ACE (NGO) - - - - - v - - 
Source: Field Survey (2001). 
NB. RECHA= Rural Environment and Community Health Awareness; PGVS= Pragati  
Gramin Vikas Sansthan; ACE= Action for Community Empowerment 
.  
The women and youth groups are found in all village and are involved in religious and social 
activities like celebrating festivals, Ganesh puja, Durga puja, singing hymns (bhajans).  
 
No NGOs were based in any of the villages in Narsimhapur district. This is not surprising as these 
villages are reasonably better off than those in Betul district. The organisations like RECHA, 
Pradeepan, PGVS, and ACE were in the Betul and Bhimpur blocks of the Betul district.  These 
organisations are working for the improvement of economic and social standard of living of the 
people. The organisation RECHA and ACE are involved in the implementing water and sanitation 
project run by UNICEF. PGVS and Pardeepan are working towards the empowerment of Panchayat 
Raj institutions and community based organisations. However, it was difficult to assess the impact of 
these initiatives. 
 
8. 4.1 Composition and Membership 
The membership of the women and youth groups is open and to members of the village. Each of the 
groups has an elected President and office bearers. The decisions are taken in an open environment 
and the meetings are conducted in an informal environment. 
 
The voluntary agencies have a closed membership, that is, members of the village do not become 
members of the organisation. These organisations have developed their own groups in the village and 
intervene either (as part of the project as in case of RECHA and ACE) through their proje ct based 
committees or through the groups formed on their own initiative (as in case of Pradeepan and PGVS). 
 
8.4.2 Meetings and Functions  
The planning meetings of the organisations do not have any input from the village. Though the work 
in each of the village is planned by the groups that have been initiated by the organisations. The 
function of groups developed under the project (RECHA and ACE) work according to the project 
objectives, where as the work of PGVS and Pradeepan is to carry out capacity build ing events and 
providing information to the Panchayat representatives. 
 
8.4.3 Linkages with Other Institutions  
(a) PRIs  
None of the civil society organisations are directly linked with PRIs. They have neither sought 
permission from the GP or the Gram Sabha before staring their work nor do they feel that they are 
accountable to the Gram Sabha. For example, none of the organisations have placed their objectives, 
work plan or accounts in front of the GP or the Gram Sabha and sought their opinion or approval. 
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(b) Other Institutions  
There are informal links of the organisations with traditional institutions. During interview with 
organisational functionaries, the team felt that though NGOs recognised the existence of the 
traditional institutions but have not created any formal links with them. The project based institutions 
are partly the creation of these organisations and hence they are directly involved in their functioning. 
In two villages of Bhimpur block– Hirdi and Khatapani- two organisations were working in the same 
village (Pradepan/PGVS and ACE). These organisations were aware about each other’s existence but 
had not developed common programmes or formal institutional linkages. 
8.5 Co-operatives 
Co-operatives organised by different producers were found in all villages. VSS is a farmers’ co-
operative while DSS is organised by the milk producers in Hirdi village. TPSS serves the interest of 
collectors of Tendu leaves. More in-depth analysis of their economic role is part of Phase II survey. 
 
8.5.1 Composition and Membership 
The composition of the cooperative is based on the membership that has to be applied for. The 
cooperatives are registered and managed according to the rules and provisions of the Cooperative Act 
and elects its President and other office bearers.  
 
Table 8.4 Shows the Co-operatives in the Study Villages. 
Narsimhapur Betul Institutions  
Parasw
ada 
Jhoteshw
er 
B
atesara 
D
ahalw
ada 
K
hatapani 
H
irdli 
R
atanpur 
C
how
ki 
Vrihatakar Sahakari Samiti (VSS) v v v v - - - - 
Dugdah Sahakari Samiti (DSS)      v - - 
Tedu patta Sangrahak Samiti (TPSS) - - - - v v v v 
 Source: Field survey (2001). 
 
8.5.2 Meetings and Functions  
The meetings of the co-operative are held regularly and they perform their functions according to their 
objectives. The VSS provides credit to farmers for procuring seeds and fertilisers at subsidised rates. 
The government too recognises this channel and provides subsidy to the members of the cooperatives. 
 
The DSS is the cooperative of milk producers. It acts as a procurer of milk from the village and 
transports it to the processing plant. The TPSS comprise of tendu leaves gatherers. It procures the 
tendu leaves and appoints a person as its agent. The agent is responsible to deliver the leaves to the 
government collection centre.  
 
8.5.3 Linkages with Other Institutions  
(a) PRIs  
The cooperatives have no links with the PRIs. Being a closed membership organisation the 
cooperative is accountable to its own members and functions according to the decision taken by them. 
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(b) Other Institutions  
The cooperatives were not found to be linked with other institutions of local governance. 
8.6 Summary of findings 
Institutional Space  
¨ The institutional space at the micro level is clearly crowded. The dominant paradigm of 
Participatory Development means that projects, schemes and societies of all denominations 
attempt to be inclusive and to reach the people. But this has created a large number of 
independent committees that overlap in time, space and sector of activity. This raises questions 
of sustainability, complementarities of initiatives and wastage of resources through duplication 
of effort. On the contrary, the need to work directly with the people at the village level is clear 
from the fact that neither the bureaucracy nor the majority of elected members are interested in 
empowerment at the village level. 
 
¨ The picture that emerges from mapping the institutional space is that the PRIs have the legal 
mandate to plan and execute scheme for economic development, but they lack resources. The 
traditional institutions have a high degree of acceptability within the community, but they have 
closed membership and are influenced by caste dynamics and play no economic role. The 
project-based institutions are resource rich, but are bound by their own objectives and are 
directed by project officials. The civil society organisations have the information and the 
capacity to facilitate, but they are not linked with other. Each operates in the space that they 
have created in the village society. 
 
Lack of complementarity and wastage  
¨ Most institutions of local governance are formal in nature and have defined objectives. But 
there is lack of convergence in the functioning of these institutions. Neither do these institutions 
share their plans and objectives with other institutions nor do they pool resources to create 
synergies in the village. In fact in certain cases the institutions have been found to duplicate 
work of PRIs (e.g. project committees).  
 
Confusion among participants 
¨ The wide range of initiatives from which the people can benefit compels them to sign up for 
different committees. This multiple membership is often confusing as they are unsure of their 
own role or of the committee. Further misunderstanding is introduced when one scheme is 
stopped and replaced by a similar scheme with different membership. 
 
Sustainability of other institutions of local governance  
¨ In Addition to working independent of each other, none of the other formal institutions have 
any links with the PRIs.  This implies that the life of these institutions and the benefits that 
accrue to the members are limited to project life. It is necessary to establish links with the 
established local government institutions to ensure sustainability. There is a fear that certain 
amount of independence will be lost if linked to government institutions. The lack of 
accountability in PRI is an additional factor.  
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No economic role  
¨ None of the traditional societies or associations plays an economic role. The Forest Protection 
and the Water and Sanitation schemes do generate some local employment, though that is not 
the project objective. 
 
Village level intervention 
¨ The institutional space is already crowded, raising questions of sustainability and efficient use 
of resources. Further, that PRIs do not seem to play any economic role nor do they have the 
capability to plan and implement project of any reasonable size. This leads one to argue that 
while PRIs should be involved to ensure sustainability, the village level institutions have to be 
strengthened if they are to act as entry point for promoting RNFE. Issues of good governance 
and accountability have to be addressed first. 
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9 Findings and Some Initial Policy Implications 
 
 
 
9.1 Context 
The state Act (1993) on Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj takes forward the national agenda for 
decentralised governance and provides legal status to village level institutions of the state. In 
addition to the three-tier system required by national legislation, MP has introduced an additional 
institution at the village level, the Gram Sabha. Its decision-making mechanism has also been 
institutionalised through the constitution of standing committees of Gram Sabha, though only 
limited fiscal power has been devolved. There has been corresponding devolution of administrative 
powers and functionaries from the state sector to district and block level Panchayats. This should 
theoretically strengthen the position of PRIs and the Gram Sabha in the state. Overall, legislation 
attempts to generate an enabling environment for the communities to institutionalise self-
governing systems.  
 
It is in this context that this study assessed the current and future role of local governance in 
promoting economic activities. The changing political relations and interface following devolution 
of power and the relationships between different institutions of local governance were also 
examined to assess how they affect the overall functioning and effectiveness of institutions of local 
governance. 
 
9.2 Changing political interface and empowerment 
There is a considerable difference in the nature of change and empowerment, or lack of it, between 
the two districts. In Narsimhapur, a society grounded in agriculture, the sources of power and 
influence still lies in the traditional mix of upper caste, higher economic class (potential to provide 
employment to others), and proximity to government. Membership of PRI has not generated a new 
source of power. On the contrary, the traditional power groups continue their economic dominance 
and hence strong political control over the local population. Politically they have either legitimised 
their position by becoming an elected official, or have co-opted the leadership of minority groups. 
There has been little or no empowerment of the disadvantaged and economically backward 
groups as their leadership has been co-opted into mainstream politics, which still serves the 
interests of better-off groups. Although some changes are taking place, the overall path of 
development is skewed to serve the vested interests of the traditionally dominant group.  
 
In Betul, less heterogeneous and dominated by tribal communities, the rural economy is based on 
forest-based activities and long-term circular migration. Local leaders have only limited control 
over forest based activities, and migration means less dependence on the local economy. Thus, the 
relationship between village leaders and the people are looser and weaker than those found in 
Narsimhapur.  
 
 76 
In contrast to Narsimhapur, traditional power created by social structures functions parallel to the 
new sources of power created by electoral politics. The two operate in separate spheres. Democratic 
structures appear to take root more easily where the previous power relations were not tied to 
economic control. Literacy and political activism has allowed access to alternative channels of 
power and some degree of empowerment. This new leadership attempts to represent the local 
developmental needs of the community, but often has difficulties in delivering, as it is not part 
of the established political network.  As a consequence new leaders may have to work with 
more established networks. 
 
 
9.3 Power, politics and effectiveness of PRIs  
 
The analysis in this study shows that: 
 
(a) there is lack of accountability : 
- between bureaucrats and politicians;  
- between the politician and the constituency and hence lack of interest in good governance; 
 
(b) Real power relations remain relatively unchanged since: 
- real planning and development power has not been devolved; and 
- the real centre of power remains at the district level with the bureaucrats. 
 
(a) Lack of accountability  
 
Bureaucrats and politicians  
 
State legislation has created local government institutions and devolved political, administrative 
and some fiscal power. Administrative decentralisation involved transfer of functions and 
functionaries from the state sector to Panchayats sector. The aim was to facilitate and strengthen the 
PRIs. Theoretically, the civil servants are expected to take directions from the elected members. 
This study shows that the government officials continue to exercise more power over decision-
making than elected members by limiting information sharing and by minimising the role of the ZP 
to that of a rubber-stamp. Similarly at the Block level, DRDA officials generally tend to ignore the 
elected member.  
 
The allegiances and loyalties of these officials remain with their departmental line managers in 
order to ensure career progression. An increase in accountability requires a critical change in 
attitude and  orientation of the bureaucrats. Manor (1995) has noted that authority to discipline 
should move to the local authorities. The state Act has tried to address this by shifting some of the 
control of the reward system to the ZP, but this is not working because members of the ZP are not 
aware that this power has been devolved to them. This underscores the need to change the 
attitudes and motivation of both bureaucrats and elected members.  
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Politicians and the public  
 
An elaborate system of positive discrimination has been created to counter the traditional power 
relationships in the villages and in wider society. Not surprisingly these groups have acted to 
protect their interests and influence. Two strategies are used. One, the position has been legitimised 
by becoming an elected member; and two, by providing strategic support to candidates from 
minority groups before the elections and thus co-opting their allegiance. In the first instance, the 
elected member is there to protect the interest of the better off and clearly does not feel accountable 
to the wider constituency. There is also lack of accountability between local leaders of the 
disadvantaged groups and the public. This allows political manoeuvring for personal gain and 
makes possible the politics of co-option. This shows a critical need to raise awareness and 
confidence amongst the poor and the disadvantaged to demand greater accountability from 
their politicians.  
 
A realignment of power relations has taken place to maintain the power balance. Because a large 
number of elected members use the PRIs for their vested interests, they do not often engage fully in 
the process of governance. Furthermore, they use their network to conduct Panchayat business and 
hence do not bother either to familiarise with themselves with the guidelines and procedures, or 
with their responsibilities.  
 
(b)  Real power relations remain relatively unchanged  
 
Real planning and development power has not been devolved to the PRIs  
 
One of the principal functions of the PRIs is to draw up annual plans for their respective areas. The 
majority of developmental funds are channelled through the national schemes that come with fixed 
targets and budget lines. These schemes are top-down and inflexible, giving the Panchayats limited 
scope for planning. Panchayats are limited to choosing the projects under the schemes. It appears 
that while local planning is crucial for the process of decentralisation, central schemes that 
provide the planning framework are inflexible.  In terms of decision making the ZP and JP 
have been reduced to the role of a rubber stamp.  
 
The real centre of power is at the district level with the bureaucrats  
 
The most effective executive power rests with the District Collector and the bureaucrats not 
the President of the Zila Panchayat or the members . Further down the line government officials 
continue to exercise more power over decision making than elected members. The District Planning 
Committee is supposed to consolidate rural and urban plans developed by the GPs and the urban 
areas. However, currently the budgets and plans are being prepared by the DPC and passed down to 
the JP and GP. It is important to note that more and more development funds are being channelled 
through the district authorities strengthening their position.  
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The analysis also shows that the JP is becoming less relevant as power concentrates at the district 
level and legislation attempts to strengthen the village level institutions.  
 
Initial implications of the above findings are  
· that neither the local politicians nor the government officials are interested in changing the 
existing relationships or in truly strengthening village level institutions. 
· The PRIs are not serving the needs of the poor or the disadvantaged.  
· In those (few) cases where genuine representatives are elected, they find it difficult to 
operate/govern without the help of the existing political network. 
 
9.4 Village level Institutions and issues  
Findings relevant to the village level are discussed below. 
 
(a) Nature of development: Considerable power has been devolved to village level 
institutions, but this is not often used to the benefit of the poor and disadvantaged. Most 
schemes operating in the two districts target families identified as being Below the Poverty 
Line. However political leaders often intervene to manipulate the formulation of the list of 
households Below Poverty Line to include those that are above. Furthermore, the Sarpanch 
often decides the choice of projects and their location. Although some activity is taking 
place, the overall path of development is skewed to serve the interests of the traditionally 
dominant groups. The Gram Sabha needs to be more involved in decision-making. 
Discussions showed that apathy is creeping in among the people who are losing interest in 
the affairs of the Panchayat as they receive little or no feedback 
. 
(b) Fiscal power and Taxation: The Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha have been given the 
power to tax and raise revenue. These relate to tax on property, pursuit of particular 
professions; civic amenities; and trading. However, none of the Panchayats levy any tax. 
This is true even in the case of compulsory taxation. Income accruing to the local bodies is 
entirely through non-tax sources.  
 
The issue of revenue generation by PRIs is caught in a circular argument. On the one hand it is 
argued that there can be no taxation if there is no service provided, and on the other that there 
are no funds to provide these services. The PRI representatives note that they are a part of the 
community that is expected to pay the tax. The community in general is unwilling and hostile to 
the idea of paying taxes. Hence, it does not make good political sense to tax ‘your own people’ 
when neither the availability of the service or its quality can be assured. 
 
 Many of the services that the Gram Sabha can support would benefit the poor, but may be less 
relevant to the better off, i.e., those exerting power within the new system. Hence there is little 
incentive to tax (and court unpopularity) for benefits of little value to the influential. There 
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may be case for consciousness raising and generation of demand for such services among 
the poor to break the circle . NGOs have a critical role to play in this. 
 
(c) The main source of developmental funding is the national government. Only one of the 
study villages has been able to generate any revenue. Even in this village they had no plans for 
investing this money. This raises questions about the desire and ability to plan projects and 
the willingness to spend revenues on developmental projects. 
 
(d) The institutional space at the micro level is crowded and uncoordinated. The dominant 
paradigm of Participatory Development means that projects, schemes and societies of all 
denominations attempt to be inclusive and to reach the people. However, this has created a 
large number of independent committees that overlap in time, space and sector of activity. This 
raises questions of sustainability, complementarities of initiatives and wastage of resources 
through duplication of effort.  However, the need to work directly with the people at the village 
level is clear from the fact that neither the bureaucracy nor the majority of elected members are 
interested in empowerment at the village level. 
 
Each institution of local governance operates in the space that they have created in village 
society.  There is lack of convergence in the functioning of these institutions. The institutions 
do not share their plans and objectives with other institutions or pool resources to create 
synergies in the village. In certain cases the institutions have been found to duplicate work 
of PRIs (e.g. project committees). PRIs have the legal mandate to plan and execute schemes 
for economic development, but they lack resources. The traditional institutions have a high 
degree of acceptability within the community, but they have closed membership and are 
influenced by caste dynamics and play little if any economic role. The project-based institutions 
are resource rich, but are bound by their own objectives and are directed by project officials. 
The civil society organisations have the information and the capacity to facilitate, but they are 
not linked with other organisation.   This implies that in order to maximise benefits, building on 
the achievements of existing projects should be part of future project design. Most projects are 
designed in isolation of other on-going projects in the region and constrained by their 
objectives. 
 
(e) Confusion among participants: The wide range of initiatives at the village level from which 
the people can benefit obliges them to sign up for different committees. This multiple 
membership is often confusing as they are unsure of their own role or that of the committee. 
Further misunderstanding is introduced when one scheme is stopped and replaced by a similar 
scheme with different membership.  
 
(f)  Sustainability of other institutions of local governance: In addition to working independent 
of each other, none of the other formal institutions have any links with the PRIs.  This implies 
that the life of these institutions and the benefits that could accrue to the members are limited to 
the projects duration. It is necessary to establish links with the established local government 
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institutions to ensure sustainability, however there is a fear amongst independent institutions  
that a certain amount of freedom will be lost if links are made to government bodies. The lack 
of accountability in PRI is an additional factor.  
 
(g) Village level intervention:  The PRIs do not seem to play any economic role nor do they have 
the capability to plan and implement project of any reasonable size. (Although the Panchayat 
and Gram Sabha’s capability to deliver small-scale, low level infrastructure and of other soft 
components (e.g., education, health care) of development should be recognised.)  This leads 
one to argue that while PRIs should be involved to ensure sustainability, the village level 
institutions have to be strengthened if they are to act as lower-level entry points for promoting 
RNFE. Issues of good governance and accountability have to be addressed first. 
 
(h) The need for rationalisation Villages are awash with institutions and committees, with an 
even greater diversity of objectives and responsibilities, raising questions of sustainability and 
efficient use of resources.  There appears to be a desperate need for rationalisation of bodies 
and responsibilities amongst these institutions operating at village level.  This needs to be 
accompanied by a realistic assessment of the capabilities of villagers, especially the poor and 
disadvantaged.  Such a process should also include comprehensive measures to raise awareness, 
confidence, and empowerment, again with a focus upon the poor and disadvantaged.  Whilst 
this need is both obvious and fundamental, the mechanisms for implementation are unclear and 
the likelihood of significant initiatives is similarly remote. 
 
9.5 Lack of an economic perspective  
 
(a) Most non-farm activities are undertaken primarily to meet household needs. 
 The study identified a wide range of non-farm activities in the two districts. These include 
processing outputs of agriculture, forestry, fishing and animal husbandry. Processing of wood, 
leather, clay and bamboo and are also important in nearly all study villages. Very little of this 
(except jaggery) enters the market. These activities rely on traditional skills, which in turn are 
caste based. 
 
(b) Caste dominates occupation at village level.  
 Crucially for promoting new economic activities in rural MP caste still determines the 
economic occupation of individuals and households. However, when individuals move to larger 
settlements they often take up activities, which they are unable to pursue in their own 
village/milieu, primarily because caste is less of an issue in urban areas. The implications for 
development of RNFE are twofold. One, promoting activities based on traditional caste 
based skills could go to reinforcing an undemocratic system; and two, that larger 
settlements may be better entry points for promoting RNFE. 
 
(c) Focus on employment generation: 
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 The analysis in this study highlights the absence of emphasis on productivity and development 
of productive activities. The emphasis is on employment generation, reflecting past macro level 
developmental thinking and planning in India. Although at the national level the emphasis is 
changing towards productivity, this has yet to be reflected in developmental schemes and 
projects being implemented at the village level. 
 
(d) PRIs concentrate on welfare projects as against promoting new economic activities 
 Review of activities of Gram Panchayats and Gram Sabhas showed that work undertaken from 
their own funds is related to developing infrastructure and other facilities in the village. These 
projects create only short-term employment; and it is only incidental if it is in the non-farm 
sector. Co-operatives are the only other institution that actively assists in promoting economic 
activities. However, currently they appear to be very small players in the districts studied.  
Overall the promotion of economic development is considered a function of the government 
line departments. The formal local government institutions are not involved in promoting 
RNFE or any significant economic activities. Including PRIs, particularly at the village 
level, in projects supporting the growth of non-farm activities would require enhancing 
capability in economic understanding and analysis. 
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Annex 1 
 
Rural Non-farm activities identified in the study villages. 
 
Processing Of Primary sector On-Farm Produce  
The on-farm produce relates to produce of agriculture, animal husbandry including fisheries, and 
collection of forest produce. The non-farm activities identified for the processing of these products 
are given in Table A1 
 
Table A1 Activities in selected villages that are carried out for the processing of on-farm 
produce  
 
Name of the Village 
Narsimhpur Betul 
RNFE Activity Product on 
which RNFE 
is carried out 
P
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REMARKS  
1. Preparing the produce for sale or 
consumption 
  
1.1 Threshing v v v v v v v v 
1.2 De husking v v v v v v v v 
1.3 Cleaning v v v v v v v v 
1.4 Packing v v v v v v v v 
1.5 Storing 
- Wheat 
- Gram 
- Pulses  
- Soybean 
v v v v v v v v 
- Pulses are not 
cultivated in the 
villages of Betul 
- Pulses include 
tuwar, moong, urad, 
channa, and masoor 
2. Processing of agriculture produce   
2.1 Milling  v v v v - - - - 
2.2 Grinding v v v v v v v v 
2.3 Pounding 
- Pulse & 
Gram 
- Wheat 
- Paddy 
- - - - v v v v 
- Pounding is done in 
case of Paddy and 
milling in case of 
Pulses 
- Paddy is not 
cultivated in 
Narsimhapur 
2.4 Jaggery  - Sugar cane v v v v - - - v 
    
- In Betul, the 
villagers are migrating 
to nearby blocks for 
making jaggery  
3. Food processing    
3.1 
 
Papad making - Pulses  
- Gram 
- Maize 
v v v v v v v v -Almost all 
households make 
papadums  largely for 
their own 
consumption.  
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Name of the Village 
3.2 Nugget (badi) 
Making 
- Pulses  
- White 
Pumpkin 
v v v v v v v v - In Betul, villages do 
not have white 
pumpkin.  
- Nuggets of various 
cereals and some 
times vegetables are 
made in almost all the 
houses.  
4. Fruit Processing   
4.1 Cutting v v v v v v v v 
4.2 Drying 
- Mango 
- Gooseberry v v v v v v v v 
4.3 Pickle making - Mango 
- Lemon 
v v v v v v v v 
    
- During the season 
the fruits are collected 
and dried. ST house 
holds resort to selling 
of fruits as a 
supplementary cash 
earning activity.  
- Pickle making is for 
household 
consumption only. 
5. Processing of MFP  
- v - v v v v v 5.1 Drying - Mahua seeds  
and flowers 
- Gum 
- Tendupatta  
- Dori 
- Achar  
 
- Processing of the 
minor forest produce is 
the major RNFE 
activity.  
- All the family 
members are involved 
in the collection and 
processing. 
  
5.2 Cleaning - Gum - v - - v - - - 
5.3 Pounding - Gum - v - - v - - - 
- Gum collection is 
declining due to 
decline in number of 
trees. 
5.4 Oil extraction - Mahua seeds - v - v v v v v In Betul, oil extraction 
is done for household 
consumption.   
5.5 Chironji 
Extraction 
- Acchar  
- Guthli 
- v - v v v v v - Seeds are extracted 
after drying. 
- Chironji on large 
scale in Narsimhapur 
and Guthli in Betul.  
5.5 Cutting  - Fuel wood v v v v v v v v - In all villages people 
gather wood for fuel. 
Poor and landless 
families sell fuel wood  
for Rs5/10  
6. Animal Products   
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6.1 Yoghurt - Milk v v v v v v v v 
6.2 Butter - Milk  v v v v v v v v 
6.3  Clarified butter  - Milk v v v v v v v v 
-Milk includes cow 
and buffalo milk. 
- Yoghurt, butter, ghee 
is  prepared by every 
household.  
- Yadav families with 
dairies sell milk 
products at the nearby 
towns  
v v v v v v v v 6.4 Selling of 
animals for 
meat 
- Poultry 
- Goats  
- Animals are sold and 
at market places. Meat 
is sold by persons 
from Khatik 
community only or 
persons belonging to 
Muslim community.  
v v v v v v v v 6.5 Fuel  - Cow dung 
 
- Dung cake are 
prepared from the cow 
dung and stored. These 
are used by household 
for their own 
consumption, but if the 
need arises they are 
sold in the market as 
well.  
 
Activities Making Specific Identifiable Products  
This category includes products that are made within the village. These products are made through 
the processing of a primary product, e.g. wood or clay. People recognised for their specific skills 
manufacture these products. 
 
 Table A.2 Activities in selected villages that are carried out for making specific          
identifiable products 
Name of the Village 
Narsimhapur Betul 
RNFE Activity Product 
on which 
RNFE is 
carried 
out 
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REMARKS  
1. Processing of wood   
1.1 Drying - v v v v v v v 
1.2 Cutting - v v v v v v v 
1.3 Making items  
Wood 
- v v v v v v v 
- Items made include: table, 
chair, cot, bullock cart, 
agriculture equipment, axe, 
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Name of the Village 
1.4 Polishing  - v v v v v v v door, window, door and 
window frame, wooden toys 
for children 
2. Processing of leather   
2.1 Cutting - v v v - - - - 
2.2 Making items  v v v v - - - - 
2.3 Polishing 
Leather 
v v v v - - - - 
- Items made include: shoes, 
chappals, and harness. 
- Now a days rubber tyre are 
also used as raw material. 
3. Processing of metals   
3.1 Melting v v v v v v v v 
3.2 Making items  
Iron 
v v v v v v v v 
- Items like: blade for the 
plough, hammer, axe, nails,  
4. Processing of bamboo   
4.1 Drying v v v v v v v v 
4.2 Cutting v v v v v v v v 
4.3 Making items  v v v v v v v v 
4.4 Polishing 
Bamboo 
v v v v v v v v 
    
- Before preparing any item, 
the bamboo is dried and cut.  
- Various items of bamboo 
include basket for storing and 
for carrying things, mats, 
house construction, items for 
domestic use 
- The items are polished and 
proper finishing is done 
before taking to the markets. 
5. Processing of clay   
5.1 Sieving  v v v v v v v v 
5.2  Mixing v v v v v v v v 
5.2 Making items  v v v v v v v v 
5.3 Baking v v v v v v v v 
5.4 Polishing 
Clay 
v v v v v v v v 
    
- For plastering clay is sieved 
and mixed with cow dung, 
sand, red soil, lime etc  
- Items like: pitcher, lamp, 
pot, utensils, grinder, stove, 
storing containers, tiles, 
bricks, plastering, flooring 
- At Narsimhapur the houses 
were making boundaries of 
clay 
- Baking is done in case of 
pitchers and vessels  
- Some items are polished and 
painted before selling 
6. Stitching of cloth    
6.1 Tailoring Cloth - - v v - - v v - Families belonging to 
Namdev caste are involved in 
stitching of clothes.  
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Tertiary Activities 
Number of RNFE activities that were identified was in the nature of providing services to the 
community. These activities ranged from repair and maintenance of equipment to services that are 
offered by the Priest. All such services have been listed in Table A3. 
 
Table A.3 Activities in sele cted villages that are carried out for providing specific services 
Name of the Village  
Narsimhapur Betul 
RNFE Activity Product on 
which RNFE 
is carried out 
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REMARKS 
1. Personal care  
1.1 Cutting of hair v v v v v v v v 
1.2 Shaving 
Men 
v v v v v v v v 
1.3 Massage  v v v v v v v v 
1.4 Cleaning of 
ear 
v v v v v v v v 
1.5 Cleaning & 
cutting of nails 
Men 
Women 
v v v v v v v v 
- People belonging to 
the Sen community are 
involved in personal 
care of men. The 
women from the same 
community are involved 
in the personal care for 
women.  
2. Health care  
2.
1 
Pre and Post 
natal care 
Pregnant 
women 
v v v v v v v v 
2.
2 
Healers - Men, Women 
and Children 
v v v v v v v v 
    
- Dai in the village 
specialises in 
conducting deliveries 
and post-natal care.  
- People go to 
Traditional healers first 
and in case of 
complications do they 
go to a Medical doctor  
3. Repair and Maintenance   
3.
1 
Puncture repair - - v - - - - v 
- v v v - - v v 3.
2 
Mechanical 
repair 
- Cycle 
- Motorcycle  
- Tractor 
- Thresher          
- The owner himself 
undertakes small repairs 
& maintenance. 
Mechanic is called for 
complicated problems 
only.  
 87 
3.
3 
Electrical 
repair 
- Domestic 
electric 
problem 
- Radio, tape 
recorders 
v v v v - v v v - Villagers learn small 
electric repairs and 
call/go to the mechanic 
in case of major repairs 
3.
4 
Welding Tractors and 
other metal 
- - v - - - - - - Carpenters have 
learned welding and 
repair of modern 
equipment.  
v v v v v v v v 3.
5 
House repair - Plastering of 
walls 
- Flooring 
- Repair of 
roof, beams, 
windows and 
doors  
 
- Villagers themselves 
do all the repairs. But if 
any specific repairs are 
required person skilled 
is called.  
4. Animal care    
v v v v v v v v 4.
1 
Taking the 
animal for 
grazing 
- Cows.  
- Buffalo 
- Goats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Children from the 
household are 
responsible for grazing 
of animals.   
- In some cases animals 
of the villages are given 
to particular people 
known as Gwals in 
Narsimhapur and Thatia  
in Betul. 
v v v v v v v v 4.
2 
Veterinary care - Illness 
among 
domestic 
animals  
- Care during  
delivery of 
animals 
 
- Traditional healers are 
referred either in the 
same village or taken to 
other villages.  
5. Other services           
5.
1 
Conducting 
prayers 
- v v v - v v v 
v v 5.
2 
Conducting 
ceremonies 
 
- v v v - v 
  
- Priests are called to 
perform prayers and 
conduct pujas.  
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